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I. in t r o d u c t io n
The availability of alternate refuge is considered at various stages of the Canadian 
refugee determination process. In the context of refugee law, alternate refuge refers 
to the analysis undertaken by refugee-receiving states regarding the availability of 
protection for refugee claimants outside their own borders. Under Canadian refugee 
law, the two main applications of the alternate refuge concept are the safe third country 
rule and the internal flight alternative (IFA).
This paper analyzes the procedural and substantive elements of the alternate 
refuge requirement and determines their impact upon individuals seeking protection 
on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity, namely gay men, lesbians, 
bisexuals and transgendered people (sexual minorities).1 In doing so, the analysis
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1 While judicial and administrative decision-makers commonly refer to certain claimants as 
“homosexuals,” this practice is best avoided. Arguments against this use of language include 
its medicalization of sexuality and lack of use within the community of sexual minorities. 
See: Kristen L. Walker, “Sexuality and Refugee Status in Australia” (2000) 12:2 Int’l J. 
Refugee L. 175 at 176. The term “sexual minority” is used in this paper where reference is 
made to individuals who seek refugee status on the basis of their membership in a particular 
social group, namely due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. The term sexual 
minority is defined so as to include gay men, lesbians, and bisexual and transgendered 
persons. The term therefore incorporates both individuals who are attracted to people of the 
same biological sex and those who violate societal gender-norms. See: Nicole LaViolette, 
“Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the Scope of the Canadian Guidelines” (2007) 
19:2 Int’l J. Refugee L. 169 at 185 at FN 92 [LaViolette, Gender]. Some legal scholars have 
defined the term so as to include people suffering from HIV/AIDS. See: Walker, cited above 
in this note, at 176. Unfortunately, the impact of alternate refuge measures upon individuals 
experiencing the intersection of HIV/AIDS and sexual minority status is a matter beyond the 
scope of this research paper. The term will be therefore be limited by the definition noted 
above.
examines how Canadian refugee law determines in individual cases if protection 
is available to refugees in a safe third country or within their home states by way 
of an internal flight alternative. The study reveals that alternate refuge measures 
systematically disadvantage sexual minority claimants. This negative impact could 
be alleviated, however, if decision-makers applied a more nuanced analysis to such 
claims. Decision-makers must consider the particular circumstances of sexual 
minority claimants in a consistent manner and refine their evaluations of country 
conditions, in order to reduce the disadvantage perpetuated by the current methods of 
analysis.
The research paper is structured in four parts. Part I provides the reader 
with an overview of Canada’s legal obligation toward refugees and discusses the 
fundamental principle of non-refoulement. Part I then outlines the parameters of 
Canada’s refugee determination system and explains how claims asserted on the basis 
of sexual orientation and gender identity have been addressed within it. Part II of the 
research paper focuses upon the safe third country rule and analyzes its impact upon 
sexual minority claimants. This section examines the procedural and substantive 
elements of the concept, specifically how the opportunity to claim refuge in a third 
country can affect the ability of individuals to make successful refugee claims within 
Canada. The Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) between Canada and the United 
States (U.S.),2 relevant Federal Court decisions, and the issue of credibility are 
examined in this part.
Part III of the research paper explores the nature of IFA findings and how 
they affect sexual minority claimants. This section focuses on the legal principles 
developed by the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal and the principles 
applied by the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board), whereby the availability 
of refuge within other regions of a claimant’s home state affects the viability of his 
or her refugee claim. Part III focuses on refugee determinations involving Mexican 
claimants. Part IV draws out commonalities between the issues explored in the previous 
parts and argues that sexual minority claimants are systematically disadvantaged by 
the application of the alternate refuge requirement to their claims.
1.1 The Canadian Refugee Determination Process
Canada is a signatory to both the Convention relating to the Status o f  Refugees (the 
Refugee Convention) and the Protocol relating to the Status o f  Refugees.3 These
2 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government o f the United States of 
America for Cooperation in the Examination o f Refugee Status from Nationals from Third 
Countries (5 December 2002) [STCA], online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC): 
<http://www.cic.gc. ca/ english/department/laws-policy/safe-third. asp>.
3 Convention relating to the Status o f Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, Can. T.S. 
1969 No. 7 [Refugee Convention]; Protocol relating to the Status o f Refugees, 31 January 
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 29 [Protocol].
international instruments constitute the primary source of Canada’s legal obligations 
toward refugees; their objectives have been incorporated domestically in the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection A ct (IRPA) and its regulations.4 Of particular 
interest to the current study is the obligation found in Article 33(1) of the Refugee 
Convention:5
No Contracting States shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion.
The principle of non-refoulement is a cornerstone of international refugee 
law.6 Pursuant to this principle, which is also enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention 
against Torture an d  other Cruel, Inhuman or D egrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT),7 receiving countries may not, whether directly or indirectly, return refugees to 
a country where they face a serious risk of persecution.
The prohibition against refoulement is not absolute. Article 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention provides that where there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that a refugee is a danger to the receiving country, he or she may not benefit from the 
principle of non-refoulement.8
The alternate refuge concept is directly connected to the principle of non­
refoulement. Requiring a refugee claimant to seek protection outside of Canada, 
whether from a third country or a different region of his or her home state, involves 
determining whether he or she faces a risk of refoulement or persecution in the country 
to which he or she is being deported. This determination requires close analysis on 
the part of the decision-maker of both the claimant’s personal circumstances and the 
country conditions he or she might face outside Canada.
4 S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA],
5 Refugee Convention, supra note 3 at Art. 33(1).
6 Nils Coleman acknowledges that “majority doctrinary opinion” considers non-refoulement 
a principle of customary law, but argues that it is no longer an unconditional regional 
international custom in Europe, due to the evolution of a new norm that allows exceptions 
in cases involving mass influxes of refugees. See: Nils Coleman, “Non-Refoulement 
Revised: Renewed Review of the Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement as Customary 
International Law” (2003) 5 Eur. J. Migr. & L. 23 at 23.
7 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36 [CAT],
8 Refugee Convention, supra note 3 at Art. 33(2).
Refugee claims made from within Canada or at the Canada-U.S. land border 
are subject to findings regarding the availability of alternate refuge.9 The inland refugee 
determination process begins when an individual advises an immigration official 
of his or her desire to claim refugee status. The officer then proceeds to interview 
the claimant and makes a threshold determination regarding the eligibility of his or 
her claim. Claims may be ineligible if the person: has refugee status in Canada or 
elsewhere, is a failed refugee claimant, traveled through a safe third country prior to 
entering Canada, or is a serious security/criminality risk.10 The exclusion of refugee 
claimants on the basis of their passage through the U.S. is discussed in Part II.
Eligible claims are then referred to the Refugee Protection Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board for determination. Once the claimants file their 
Personal Information Form (PIF), the Board may hear their claim via the fast-track or 
full hearing process.11 Issues involving access to a safe third country or the availability 
of an IFA are addressed in the context of the hearing process. Failed refugee claimants 
may seek judicial review of the Board’s decision with leave from the Federal Court. 
An application for judicial review is not equivalent to an appeal. The judicial review 
process involves an assessment of the Board’s decision based upon administrative 
law principles.12 If the application for judicial review is allowed, the claim is usually 
sent for re-determination by a different member of the Board. Further appeals may be 
sought from the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, subject to 
leave requirements.13
9 Note that individuals may also seek asylum from outside Canada, for instance from refugee 
camps or through the resettlement program. See: Martin Jones and Sasha Baglay, Refugee 
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 187-214 [Jones, Refugee Law].
10 Immigration and Refuge Board, “Process for Making a Claim for Refugee Protection”, 
online: IRB: < http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/procedures/processes/rpd/rpdp_e. 
htm>.
11 Ibid.
12 Decisions by administrative tribunals such as the Board are subject to review on one of two 
standards: reasonableness and correctness. The level of deference accorded to a particular 
decision depends upon the nature of the issues at stake. Decisions involving questions of fact 
are generally reviewed on a reasonableness standard, and are therefore accorded a higher 
level of deference, while questions of mixed law and fact are subject to a lower level of 
deference. Pure questions of law are subject to a correctness standard and are subject to 
the least amount of judicial deference. (See: David J. Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, 
Text and Materials (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) at Chapter 3 “Jurisdiction”.). It is 
important to note that the standard of patent unreasonableness was recently dismissed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, (2008) 291 D.L.R. 
(4th) 577.
13 In order to appeal a Federal Court decision, the lower court must certify a serious question 
of general importance. See: IRPA, supra note 4 at para. 74(d). In order to appeal a Federal 
Court of Appeal decision, leave of the Supreme Court of Canada is required. In this situation, 
leave may be obtained where the case raises an issue of public importance. See: Supreme 
Court of Canada, “Filing an application for leave”, online: SCC < http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ 
faq/ala-daa/index-eng.asp>.
1.2 Refugee Claims Based on Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity
In ajournai article published in 1993, Suzanne Goldberg described the persecution 
experienced by sexual minorities throughout the world as follows:
Their persecution takes the form of police harassment and assault, 
involuntary institutionalization and electroshock and drug “treatments”, 
punishment under laws that impose extreme penalties including death for 
consensual lesbian or gay sexual relations, murder by paramilitary death 
squads, and government inaction in response to criminal assaults against 
lesbians and gay men.14
Fifteen years later, sexual minorities continue to face serious discrimination 
and persecution at the hands of both state and private actors. Human rights organizations 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented this abuse 
and published reports regarding the persecution faced by sexual minorities worldwide.15
Sexual contact between consenting adults of the same sex is criminalized 
in eighty-six member-states of the United Nations and is punished by death in seven 
countries.16 As noted in a 2007 report issued by the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association (ILGA), while many states do not actively enforce these laws, they 
“reinforce a culture.. .where hatred and violence are somehow justified by the State and 
force people into invisibility or into denying who they truly are.”17 The criminalization 
of sexual activity between same-sex partners creates a pervasive homophobic 
environment within which the extortion, suppression, physical and sexual abuse, 
and harassment of sexual minorities is tolerated and perpetuated by a multitude of 
actors. Sexual activity between same-sex partners is also regulated indirectly through 
“morality” and “public order” provisions.18 Therefore, sexual minorities in states that
14 Suzanne B. Goldberg, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum and the Global 
Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men” (1993) 26 Cornell Int’l L. J. 605 at 605 to 606.
15 For more information about the worldwide persecution of sexual minorities see the following 
reports: Amnesty International, Crimes o f Hate, Conspiracy o f Silence: Torture and Ill- 
Treatment Based on Sexual Identity, (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2001); Human 
Rights Watch, “Turkey: We Need a Law for Liberation: Gender, Sexuality, and Human Rights 
in a Changing Turkey” (2008), online: HRW < http://hrw.org/reports/2008/turkey0508/ 
turkey0508webwcover. pd£>.
16 International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), “Being lesbian or gay is risking jail time 
in 86 countries and death penalty in 7”, News Release, (14 May 2008), online: ILGA <http:// 
www.ilga.org/news_results.asp?FileCategory=9&ZoneID=7&FileID=1165>.
17 Daniel Ottoson, “State-sponsored Homophobia: A world survey of laws prohibiting same sex 
activity between consenting adults” (April 2007) at 4, online: ILGA < http://www.ilga.org/ 
statehomophobia/State_sponsored_homophobia_ILGA_07.pdf>.
18 Jenni Millbank, “Gender, Sex and Visibility in Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation” (2004) 18 Geo. Immgr. L. J. 71 at 89.
do not explicitly criminalize their sexual relations still encounter persecution in their 
daily lives.
Article 1A of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee as any person who:
...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership o f a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.19 [emphasis added]
This definition is incorporated in Canadian legislation.20 The grounds listed 
in the Convention’s definition do not explicitly provide for refugee protection on the 
basis of sexual minority status; it is now well-established in Canadian jurisprudence, 
however, that refugee claims based upon sexual orientation or gender identity may 
constitute membership in a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee 
definition.21
Legal scholars Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank conducted a study 
which determined that, between 1994 and 2000, the success rate of refugee claims 
made in Canada based upon sexual orientation was about fifty-four percent.22 Building 
upon this research, Sean Rehaag cites UN documentation establishing that the 
overall success rate of refugee claims in Canada during this period was sixty percent, 
therefore the rate for sexual minority claimants was not far off the overall average.23 
Rehaag also found that in 2004 claims based on sexual minority status were equally, if 
not somewhat more, successful than the average claim. Forty-nine percent of sexual 
minority claimants were granted refugee status, while the average success rate for 
all claims was forty-five percent.24 While the acceptance rates raise no immediate 
concerns, a closer look at the scope and application of the alternate refuge concept 
reveals problems with the analysis made in cases based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity.
19 Refugee Convention, supra note 3 at Article 1A. The time restriction in the Convention was 
lifted pursuant to the 1967 Protocol, supra note 3.
20 IRPA, supra note 4 at s. 96.
21 Canada (A.G.) v. Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689, (1993) 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 70 [Ward].
22 Jenni Millbank, “Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in Canada 
and Australia” (2002) 26 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 144 at 148 -149 [Millbank, Imagining].
23 Sean Rehaag, “Patrolling the Borders of Sexual Orientation: Bisexual Refugee Claims in 
Canada” (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 59 at 69.
24 Ibid at 71.
II. SAFE THIRD COUNTRY RULE
The safe third country rule is premised on the concept that refugee-receiving states may 
deflect claimants to any safe country they have traveled through prior to their arrival.25 
As a result, refugee claimants are forced to seek alternate refuge outside the state 
where they originally chose to make their claim. A common manifestation of the safe 
third country rule is the “country of first arrival” principle. Pursuant to this principle, 
refugee-receiving states may return claimants to the first country from which they 
could have sought refugee status after fleeing their home states. The impact of the safe 
third country rule upon individuals seeking refugee status in Canada is particularly 
significant, since it is often impossible to reach Canada without first traveling through 
the U.S. or another state, such as the United Kingdom.
The main justification for the rule is that it allows states to share the burden of 
dealing with the international population of refugee claimants in a collective manner.26 
The safe third country rule addresses the issue of forum- or asylum-shopping by refugee 
claimants by working to invalidate their choice of asylum location by authorizing their 
return to a state where they are deemed to have had the opportunity to claim refugee 
status.27 Moreover, the safe third country rule may be used to question the genuineness 
of refugee claims. A claimant’s failure to seek asylum at the first opportunity can 
lead decision-makers to make negative inferences about the credibility of his or her 
subjective fear of persecution.
This study considers the application of the safe third country rule to 
refugee claims made by sexual minorities in two contexts: substantive credibility 
determinations made within the Canadian refugee determination system and the 
STCA between Canada and the U.S. It is important to distinguish the decision-makers 
involved in these contexts. Credibility determinations are made by the Board and may 
be subject to judicial review before the Federal Court, while the STCA is an agreement 
negotiated, adopted, and implemented by the two states involved.
2.1 Credibility Findings -  Subjective Fear of Persecution
25 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 295 [Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees].
26 Ibid. at 293. See also: preamble to the STCA, supra note 2.
27 The UNHCR considers a refugee claimant’s choice of country of asylum to be an important 
consideration, which problematizes initiatives such as the STCA. See: Kemi Jacobs, “The 
Safe Third Country Agreement: Innovative Solution or Proven Problem?” (2002) Policy 
Options 33 at 35.
The assessment of a claimant’s credibility is a pivotal component of the refugee 
determination process.28 Generally, a claimant’s sworn testimony is presumed true 
unless there is reason to question its validity.29 In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the 
Board may consider issues such as demeanour, the consistency of his or her testimony, 
and the plausibility of the evidence presented during the hearing.30 Refugee claimants 
bear the onus of demonstrating that their fear of persecution is both subjectively and 
objectively well-founded. There is some controversy over the validity of the subjective 
element of the bipartite test, given the difficulty of assessing the state of mind of a 
refugee claimant.31 It appears, however, that the Board still makes credibility findings 
in relation to the subjective element of the requirement, namely that a claimant’s state 
of mind is one of fear of persecution.32
An individual’s failure to seek refugee status in a safe third country can 
have a negative impact upon the Board’s assessment of his or her subjective fear 
of persecution. As noted by Michael Bossin and Laila Demirdache, the Board’s 
“understanding of human behaviour” often equates the failure to seek refuge in a safe 
third country with a lack of subjective fear of persecution.33 In Ilie v. Canada (M. C.I.), 
the Federal Court held that evidence of a refugee claimant’s failure to seek asylum in 
other countries was a relevant consideration in assessing his or her subjective fear of 
persecution. With respect to this issue, the Court stated:
Finally, in my opinion the tribunal was entitled to consider his failure to 
claim refugee status in other countries while traveling from July 1992 to 
January 1993 in Europe, and to consider the applicant’s evidence in light of 
that. In doing so it here concluded that his traveling for six months or so 
without seeking refugee status negated his evidence of fear of persecution 
if  he were returned to Romania. That finding goes to the root of the 
applicant’s claim. It was not necessary to set out other or more detailed
28 See: Steve Norman, “Assessing the Credibility of Refugee Applicants: A Judicial Perspective” 
(2007) 19:2 Int’l J. Refugee L. 273.
29 See: Maldonado v. M.E.I., [1980] 2 F.C. 302, 31 N.R. 34 (C.A.) at para. 5.
30 IRB Legal Services, “Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection” (31 
January 2004), online: IRB <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/legal/rpd/assesscred/ 
index_e.htm?>.
31 Michael Bossin and Laila Demirdache cite refugee law scholars James Hathaway and Guy 
Goodwin-Gill in reaching the following conclusion: “Adopting a test that requires more 
attention to the objective nature of risk facing refugee claimants, and less on what may 
be going on in their minds, would place emphasis, quite properly in our view, on the need 
for protection.” See: Michael Bossin and Laila Demirdache, “A Canadian Perspective on 
the Subjective Component of the Bipartite Test for ‘Persecution’: Time for Re-evaluation” 
(2004) 22:1 Refuge 108 at 116.
32 Emily Carasco et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2007) at 582.
33 Bossin, supra note 31 at 111.
reasons for not accepting that the applicant had established a well-founded 
fear of persecution.34
The Court’s decision in Ilie establishes that the Board may draw a negative 
inference with respect to a refugee claimant’s subjective fear of persecution where he 
or she has failed to seek asylum in a safe third country.
It is important to note that failure to seek refugee status in a country of 
first arrival, or in any other safe country, is not determinative of a refugee claim. In 
Gavryushenko v. Canada (M.C.I.), the Federal Court established that, while failure to 
seek refugee status in a safe third country was a relevant consideration with respect to 
credibility, it did not preclude claimants from seeking refuge in Canada.
There is, however, evidence that the Board continues to struggle with the 
nature of safe third country considerations. Romero v. Canada (M.C.I.) involved a 
bisexual refugee claimant from Panama who studied in Costa Rica from 1994 until 
1998.35 The Board’s decision with respect to her claim provides a cursory overview of 
the facts alleged and concludes as follows:
While I empathize with the problems that Kaila had in Panama because of 
her bisexuality, the fact of the matter is that she stayed in Costa Rica for 
almost five years. Costa Rica is the most liberal of the Latin American 
countries as far as gays and lesbians are concerned. Kaila has given no 
explanation why she could not have stayed on in Costa Rica and enjoyed 
the kind of lifestyle there that Panama denied her. She gave no satisfactory 
explanation as to why she did not claim refugee status in Costa Rica, 
especially since Costa Rica is one of the Convention signatories.36
Upon judicial review, the Court noted the claimant’s argument that she had 
not sought asylum in Costa Rica because “the events that gave rise to her decision 
to seek refugee protection in Canada took place several years after she had returned 
from Costa Rica.”37 The Court concluded that the Board had erred in both failing to 
address Romero’s substantive refugee claim and denying the claim on the basis that 
she had failed to seek asylum in a safe third country, without ever questioning her on 
the subject.
In Mendez v. Canada (M. C.I.), the Board explicitly treated a claimant’s failure 
to seek asylum in a safe third country as determinative of his refugee claim.38 Mendez 
involved a refugee claimant who fled Peru and claimed refugee status in Canada after
34 (1994) 88 F.T.R. 220 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 15 [Ilie].
35 [2004] R.P.D.D. No. 840 (QL).
36 Ibid. at para. 6.
37 Romero v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 1705 at para. 6 [Romero].
38 Mendez v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] R.P.D.D. No. 159 (QL). [Mendez]
spending only nine days in the U.S. The Board rejected the claimant’s explanation that 
he was uncomfortable with the political situation in the U.S. and found Canada to be 
more peaceful. The Board determined that a person who asserts a fear of persecution 
in his or her home state must seek asylum in a safe country at the first opportunity and 
denied the refugee claim.39 Upon judicial review, the Court found that the Board had 
erred in asserting that the issue was determinative of the claim.40
The Federal Court has provided guidance with respect to the factors to 
be considered in evaluating a claimant’s failure to seek asylum in a safe third 
country. Overall, the cases emphasize the importance of considering the particular 
circumstances facing an individual claimant in failing to claim refugee status in a safe 
third country, as well as the reasonability of his or her explanation for having failed to 
do so. The factors considered by the courts in assessing the reasonability of a refugee 
claimant’s failure to seek asylum in a safe third country are: the length of time spent 
in a safe third country prior to arrival in Canada, age, and experience (for example, 
education, travel experience, and familiarity with the refugee determination system).41 
Other factors identified in the jurisprudence include a claimant’s cultural background 
and social experiences.42 The next section of the paper examines whether these factors 
are applied effectively in cases involving sexual minority claimants.
2.2 Credibility Concerns and Sexual Minority Claimants
Refugee claimants who fail to seek asylum in safe third countries prior to their arrival 
in Canada, including sexual minorities, face common issues. For example, failure 
to seek asylum at the first opportunity may be considered evidence of a claimant’s 
intention to use the refugee determination system as a faster means of migrating to 
Canada.43 Another significant problem arises when Board members fail to undertake 
a substantive analysis of refugee claims and rely solely upon safe third country 
considerations in denying them.44 The issue of notice is also important, since refugee 
claimants must be provided with a fair opportunity to respond to questions about their 
failure to seek asylum outside Canada.
39 Ibid. at para. 18.
40 Mendez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 75, (2005) 307 F.T.R. 48 at para. 35.
41 El-Naem v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1997), 126 F.T.R. 15, 37 Imm. L.R. (2d) 304; Ilyas v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 2004 FC 1270, (2004) 41 Imm. L.R. (3d) 3.
42 See: Mendez, supra note 41 at para. 38.
43 See: D.I.Z. (Re), [2000] C.R.D.D. No. 211 (QL) at para. 22, wherein the Board notes that the 
claimant, who had alleged persecution on the basis of sexual orientation, had failed to seek 
asylum in Spain, Mexico, and the U.S., and further states: “In fact, what you were seeking to 
do was not so much to leave your country to come to North America and claim refugee status 
as to come and settle in Canada.”
44 See: Romero, supra note 38, which involved a bisexual claimant. The Court stated at para. 
7:“the Board failed to address the essence of Ms. Paris Romero’s claim for refugee protection 
and the evidence supporting it.”
In addition to the issues noted above, it is argued that sexual minority 
claimants face particular challenges in dealing with the application of safe third country 
considerations to their claims. There is evidence that a number of factors relating to 
the experience of sexual minority claimants, such as a general lack of awareness of 
their ability to claim refugee status or being closeted, may influence whether they 
seek asylum prior to their arrival in Canada. It is therefore important to recognize that 
failure to seek asylum in a safe third country should not necessarily undermine the 
credibility of a sexual minority claimant or negate the subjective element of his or her 
fear of persecution.
(i) Familiarity with the Refugee Determination Process
There is evidence that sexual minorities experiencing persecution throughout the world 
are often unaware of their eligibility for refugee status.45 While refugee claimants may 
be familiar with the fact that political opinion is a protected ground in refugee law, 
this may not be the case in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity.46 In 
Canada, the state of the law surrounding the legitimacy of refugee claims based upon 
sexual orientation was uncertain until the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1993 decision 
in Ward.4,1 Canada was one of the first refugee receiving states to settle the law on 
this issue; other jurisdictions may still have unclear policies for dealing with sexual 
minority claimants.48 Refugee claimants may therefore fail to seek asylum based upon 
their sexual orientation or gender identity until they are made aware of the availability 
of this option.
45 Victoria Neilson & Aaron Morris, “The Gay Bar: The Effect of the One-Year Filing Deadline 
on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and HIV-Positive Foreign Nationals seeking 
Asylum or Witholding of Removal” (2006) 8 N.Y.C. L. Rev. 233 at 263.
46 Affidavit (Regarding the one-year deadline for filing asylum applications in the United 
States), sworn by Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz and Philip Schrag, submitted 
to the Federal Court re: Court file IMM-7817-05 (Canadian Council o f Refugees et al v. 
Canada) at para. 13.
47 Ward, supra note 21.
48 See: E.Y.W. (Re), [2000] C.R.D.D. No. 116 (QL), at para. 12-13 [E.Y.W. Re]: “...the claimant 
could not have reasonably been expected to have made a claim to refugee status on the basis 
of his sexual orientation when he signed his Personal Information Form (PIF) on March 29, 
1993, before the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ward.. .basing a claim to refugee 
status on sexual orientation was far from settled law in 1992.” Turkey is an example of a 
state with unclear policy with respect to sexual minority refugees. Iranian sexual minority 
claimants often seek initial refuge in Turkey, where they face continued persecution and 
may look to Canada as an alternate source of protection. See: Tonda MacCharles, “Minister 
backs refugee status for gay Iranians” The Star (28 February 2009), online: Star <http:// 
www.thestar. com/ article/594493>.
A related issue is whether the country that a claimant has previously traveled 
through even recognizes refugee claims on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.49 According to the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) Europe, 
“there are nations which are still reluctant to refine immigration laws pertaining to 
asylum by including cases where a person’s life is being threatened due to sexual 
orientation.”50 It is therefore important for the Board to consider whether sexual 
orientation is recognized as a ground of asylum in a given state before concluding 
that a claimant should have sought refuge there. Hossein Alizadeh, Communications 
Coordinator for the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission 
(IGLHRC), recently issued a press release regarding the plight of two Iranian refugees 
living in Turkey. The article explains that:
...once gay refugees arrive in Turkey, the situation is bleak. Due to the 
volume of applications, it normally takes up to two years for them to be 
reassigned to a country willing to accept them. During the transitional 
period, gay refugees are only allowed to live in small towns, without the 
right to work or pursue education. While the UN Refugee Agency may 
provide some financial aid, the amount is nominal and before they are 
eligible they must be recognized as “genuine” refugees. This is a process 
with results that are not guaranteed...The situation for gay refugees is 
complicated because the Turkish public and law enforcement agents are 
very hostile to sexual minorities, despite the fact that homosexuality is not a 
crime in Turkey. In recent years, many gay and lesbian refugees have been 
subject to verbal and physical attacks.51
The situation described by Alizadeh highlights the precarious position of 
sexual minorities in states that are hostile to such claimants. Sexual minorities should 
not be penalized in the Canadian refugee determination process for failing to seek
49 In 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe highlighted the fact that most 
member states did “not recognize persecution for sexual orientation as a valid ground for 
granting asylum” in a draft recommendation urging members to recognize homosexuals as 
members of a particular social group for the purposes of asylum-seeking. See: Ruth-Gaby 
Vermot-Mangold (rapporteur), “Situation of gays and lesbians and their partners in respect 
to asylum and immigration in the member states of the Council of Europe”, Doc. 8654 
(25 February 2000), online: CE, Parliamentary Assembly: <http://assembly.coe.int/Main. 
asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/DocOO/EDOC8654.htm>.
50 ILGA Europe, “Asylum and Immigration: Protection Elsewhere”, online: < http://www.ilga- 
europe.org/europe/issues/asylum_and_immigration>. For example, Amnesty International 
notes that “persecution on the basis of sexual orientation is not explicitly recognized in law 
as a ground for granting refugee status.. .There have been no known cases of LGBT people 
seeking asylum in Belarus on the grounds of persecution because of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.” See: Viachaslau Bortnik, Belarus (2007) at 3, online: Amnesty International 
<http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/BELARUSLGBT0207.pdf>.
51 IGLHRC, News Release, “The world an unkind place for gay refugees” (20 June 2008), online: 
IGLHRC < http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/pressroom/iglhrcscommentaries/232. 
html>.
refugee status in countries where their sexual identity may not be recognized as a 
ground for refugee status under the Convention.
Another relevant consideration is the manner in which refugee claimants 
perceive the treatment of sexual minorities in other countries. It is possible that a 
refugee claimant might conclude that countries that ban same-sex marriage or adoption 
by same-sex couples might also fail to recognize sexual minorities as refugees. For 
example, while the U.S. accepts refugee claims based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity, the recent election resulted in a ban on same-sex marriage in three states 
and the preclusion of same-sex partners from adopting children in Arkansas.52 Sexual 
minority claimants who are unaware of their eligibility for refugee status under U.S. 
law might infer from their knowledge of the treatment of same-sex couples in the U.S. 
that their claims would be rejected. It is therefore important to consider whether the 
treatment of sexual minorities in a safe third country was a factor in the decision of a 
claimant not to seek refuge earlier.
Sexual minority claimants may also consider the advice of legal counsel in 
deciding whether to pursue refugee status in a country prior to arriving in Canada. 
In E.Y.W.(Re), an Indian refugee claimant left Canada for the U.S. after his claim for 
refugee status based upon religious grounds was rejected. He remained in the U.S. 
for seven months and, on the advice of counsel, chose not to seek refugee status while 
there. He then returned to Canada and filed a second refugee claim, this time on the 
basis of his sexual orientation. The claimant’s lawyer, who was also volunteer counsel 
for the Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Task Force, explained the reasons for his 
advice as follows:
Based on the disturbing trends in adjudications and my conversations with 
my Canadian counterparts, I have felt it my duty to advise individuals 
(including Mr. xxxxxxx) that they will receive a fairer and more professional 
adjudication of their asylum claim from the Canadian authorities.53
The Board accepted this explanation for the claimant’s failure to claim 
refugee status in the U.S. and did not draw a negative inference from his behaviour. 
It is therefore evident that lack of familiarity with the refugee determination system 
and the recognition of sexual orientation as a ground for refugee status in safe third
52 The election resulted in a ban on same-sex marriage in California, Florida, and Arizona. 
See: Jesse McKinley and Laurie Goodstein, “Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage” The New 
York Times (6 November 2008) A l. For more information on the U.S. approach to sexual 
minority refugee claims, see: Midwest Human Rights Partnership for Sexual Orientation and 
the Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force, Preparing Sexual-Orientation Based 
Asylum Claims: A Handbook for Advocates and Asylum Seekers, 2nd ed. (2000), online: 
Asylumlaw <http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/handbookpartl.pdf>.
53 E.Y.W (Re), supra note 48, at para. 14.
countries are important factors to consider in evaluating a sexual minority claimant’s 
failure to seek alternate refuge in a safe third country.
(ii) Social Experiences
The social experiences of sexual minority claimants often affect their ability 
to claim refugee status at any given time. As outlined in the introduction of the paper, 
sexual minorities throughout the world are being subjected to serious homophobic 
violence, harassment, and threats in their home states at the hands of both individual 
and state actors. The psychological implications of such dehumanizing treatment, such 
as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), can impact the ability of sexual minority 
claimants to seek asylum promptly.54 It can also lead to difficulties dealing with people 
in positions of authority, such as immigration officials. The Board acknowledged this 
issue in E.Y.W (Re)., wherein it cited the following instructive evidence from Dusty 
Araujo, Program Coordinator for the IGLHRC:
...some asylum seekers experience a great deal of fear in divulging 
information about their sexual orientation or HIV status. Many immigrants 
who may qualify for asylum fear or believe that revealing their sexual 
orientation or HIV status will exclude them from the process...
For fleeing immigrants around the world, asylum claims based on political 
opinion, religion, nationality or race, are for the most part, well known 
established grounds. There is generally no sense of shame or feelings of 
self oppression in revealing this kind of information under these grounds.
For many applying under “Particular Social Group,” sexual orientation 
issues may carry with it a sense of shame, self-hating and/or great fears of 
losing their life, their freedom, or their livelihood.
.. .Many asylum seekers have been victims of persecution by the state and/ 
or may have a profound distrust of government. Understanding the internal 
oppression in these cases is essential to giving them a fair opportunity to 
be heard.55
The Board then concluded:
The panel finds that the psychological and medical evidence and the 
________ declaration from Mr. Dusty Araujo not only corroborates the claimant’s
54 Affidavit, sworn by Victoria Neilson and submitted to Federal Court, Court File IMM 7818- 
OS, Canadian Council o f Refugees et al v. Canada, at para. 12. [Affidavit Neilson]. See also:
C.D.T. (Re), [1996] C.R.D.D. No. 90 (QL); and O.R.C. (Re), [1997] C.R.D.D. No. 66 (QL).
55 E.Y.W. (Re), supra note 48 at para. 18.
subjective fear of persecution as a homosexual, should he return to India, but 
it also helps to explain the claimant’s actions in not immediately claiming 
refugee status on the basis of his sexual orientation.56
The Board’s analysis of the claimant’s situation focuses upon his specific life 
experience and acknowledges that failure to claim refugee status at an earlier point can 
sometimes bolster credibility, rather than affect it negatively.
Failure to claim refugee status in a safe third country may also be the result 
of a claimant’s prior closeted experience. In Cuesta v. Canada (M.C.I.), a gay refugee 
claimant from Colombia explained that he did not seek asylum while traveling through 
Europe and Mexico because he had not yet experienced persecution in his home state 
of Colombia.57 While in Colombia, he had hidden his sexual orientation and it was not 
until he met a partner abroad and wished to live openly with him that he began fearing 
persecution. The Board determined that the claimant could have sought asylum in any 
country he had visited after meeting his partner and therefore denied his claim due to 
a lack of subjective fear of persecution. The Board’s finding was upheld on judicial 
review. This case acknowledges the claimant’s closeted experience in Colombia, but 
weighs it against his failure to seek asylum in multiple safe third countries and results 
in the denial of the claim.
Overall, it appears that the Board and the Federal Court are assessing the 
subjective fear of sexual minority claimants in light of their failure to claim refuge 
in a safe third country by focusing upon factors such as familiarity with the refugee 
determination system and social experience. The following excerpt from the Board’s 
decision in V.N.N. (Re) demonstrates a nuanced approach to the issue:
With respect to delay and failure to claim in the United States, this was 
probably the most troublesome issue of this hearing. However, in my view, 
it was not determinative because generally, delay and failure to claim is 
not in itself a basis upon which I would be prepared to render a negative 
determination, particularly where there are no other bases upon which I 
might have to doubt your subjective fear of persecution or the credibility 
of your testimony. Quite apart from that, and this is the more important 
reason with respect to the delay issue, I accept your explanation for the 
delay. You said you were having trouble dealing with your sexuality, or it 
was apparent to me that that was the case. As well, you were terrified with 
respect to approaching American authorities as to what the consequences 
might have been and you also admitted perhaps some irresponsibility in 
that regard having been counseled to take some steps and perhaps delaying.
In any event, I accept your explanation as a plausible one for the delay in 
the United States and I also accept your explanation as to the reasons as 
to why you finally chose to come to Canada. I  do not draw any negative
56 Ibid. at para. 19.
57 2005 FC 5 [Cuesta].
inference from the delay and the failure to claim in the U.S.™ [emphases 
added]
The Board’s analysis of the claimant’s situation in V.N.N. (Re) thus 
acknowledges the psychological difficulties he faced with respect to his own sexuality, 
as well as his fear of dealing with American immigration authorities.
Where, however, the Board does not interpret a refugee claimant’s conduct in 
accordance with such factors, this may result in a negative credibility determination. 
In H errera v. Canada (M.C.I.) a gay refugee claimant fled El Salvador for the U.S., 
where he remained for five years without seeking asylum.59 He arrived in Canada in 
2006 and sought refugee status on the basis of his sexual orientation. He omitted 
his stay in the U.S. from his PIF and, when confronted with the truth, gave two 
explanations for failing to seek asylum in the U.S.: that the process was too costly and 
that he had not thought of making a claim. The Board rejected this explanation and 
found that the claimant lacked both credibility and a subjective fear of persecution. 
This finding was upheld on judicial review.
Herrera touches upon a number of important issues regarding the impact of 
safe third country considerations upon the credibility and subjective fear of sexual 
minority claimants. It is evident that several elements of the Herrera case warranted 
more careful examination by the Board. One factor that was not addressed by the 
Board was the claimant’s age at the time of his stay in the U.S. On his PIF, the 
claimant stated that he was bom in 1981, meaning that he would have been about 20 
years old when he arrived in the U.S.60 Acknowledgement of the claimant’s youth 
and relative inexperience may have helped contextualize his failure to seek asylum 
in the U.S. In addition, no reference was made to whether the claimant was closeted 
while living in the U.S. There is evidence that the claimant initially gave a different 
reason for fleeing El Salvador when he entered Canada, namely, “conflict stemming 
from the distribution of his stepfather’s inheritance,” and later sought refugee status 
on the basis of his sexual orientation.61 Further inquiry into this aspect of the case may 
have provided insight into the claimant’s failure to seek asylum in the U.S. Asserting 
different grounds of protection is a common experience among sexual minority 
claimants, who may feel shame or fear over revealing their sexual identity to border 
officials.62
Finally, there is a question as to the claimant’s awareness of the possibility of 
claiming refugee status on the basis of his sexual orientation. One of the claimant’s 
reasons for failing to seek asylum in the U.S. was that “he never thought of making
58 V.N.N. (Re), [1999] C.R.D.D. No. 185 (QL).
59 2007 FC 979 [Herrera].
60 Ibid. at para. 9.
61 Ibid. at para. 8.
62 E.Y.W. (Re), supra note 48 at para. 18.
such a claim.”63 This explanation seems to reveal a lack of familiarity with the refugee 
determination process, which both the Board and the Federal Courts have cited as a 
reasonable explanation for failing to seek asylum in a safe third country. Unlike the 
cases outlined above, the analysis in Herrera involves a less thorough application of 
the factors relevant to safe third country considerations. It is possible that these issues 
were eclipsed by the claimant’s failure to mention his five-year stay in the U.S. on his 
PIF but, given the particular circumstances facing sexual minorities outlined above, 
they warranted a more specific analysis.
2.3 Safe Third Country Agreement -  Background
In assessing the STCA’s impact upon sexual minorities, it is useful to outline the 
agreement’s legislative background. Section 102(2) of the IRPA authorizes the 
creation of regulations pertaining to the designation of safe third countries by the 
Canadian government. The provision lists the following factors to be considered in 
making such a designation:
(a) whether the country is a party to 
the Refugee Convention and to the 
Convention Against Torture;
a) le fait que ces pays sont parties à 
la Convention sur les réfugiés et à la 
Convention contre la torture;
(b) its policies and practices with respect 
to claims under the Refugee Convention 
and with respect to its obligations under 
the Convention Against Torture;
b) leurs politique et usages en ce qui 
touche la revendication du statut de 
réfugié au sens de la Convention sur les 
réfugiés et les obligations découlant de 
la Convention contre la torture;
(c) its human rights record; and
(d) whether it is a party to an agreement 
with the Government of Canada for the 
purpose of sharing responsibility with 
respect to claims for refugee Protection.
c) leurs antécédents en matière de 
respect des droits de la personne;
d) le fait qu’ils sont ou non parties à un 
accord avec le Canada concernant le 
partage de la responsabilité de l’examen 
des demandes d’asile.1
Subsection 102(3) of the IRPA places a duty upon the Governor in Council 
to ensure the continuing review of these factors in relation to each designated country. 
Paragraph 101(l)(e) of the IRPA establishes that individuals arriving in Canada via a 
designated country may not be referred to the refugee determination process.64
63 Herrera, supra note 59 at para. 9.
64 Ibid. at para. 101 (l)(e).
On December 5, 2002, Canada and the U.S. entered into a bilateral safe 
third country agreement formally known as the Agreement between the Government 
o f  Canada and the United States o f  Am erica fo r  Cooperation in the Examination 
o f  Refugee Status Claims from  Nationals o f  Third Countries.65 The STCA is part of 
the Smart Border Action Plan signed by the two countries in December 200166 and 
represents the culmination of negotiations that began in the 1990s.67 The STCA came 
into force on December 29, 2004,68 and was implemented via amendments to the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR).69
The STCA is predicated upon the country of first arrival principle. Pursuant to 
the agreement, an individual seeking refugee status in Canada who has traveled through 
the U.S. prior to arriving at the Canada-U.S. land border may be returned to the U.S. 
for the determination of his or her refugee claim, and vice versa. The preamble to the 
STCA describes the agreement as a burden-sharing mechanism whereby international 
refugee protection efforts may be strengthened and gamer further public support.70 
Article 4 constitutes the main operative provision of the STCA and states that, subject 
to a number of exceptions:
.. .the party of the country of last presence shall examine, in accordance 
with its refugee determination system, the refugee status claim of any 
person who arrives at a land border port of entry on or after the effective 
date of this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim.71
This provision of the STCA therefore authorizes the “party of the country of 
last presence” to determine refugee claims made at a land border port of entry between 
Canada and the U.S., subject to a number of exemptions.72
65 STCA, supra note 2.
66 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “The Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration 
Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border”, online: DFAIT: <http://www. 
dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan-en.asp>. Point 5 under the Action Plan states: 
“Managing of Refugee/Asylum Claims :Negotiate a safe third-country agreement to enhance 
the managing of refugee claims.”
67 “Canada-United States of America: Discussions on Responsibility-Sharing for Asylum 
Seekers Adjourned” (1998) 10 Int’l J. Refugee L. 256.
68 CIC, News release, “Safe Third Country Agreement comes into force today” (29 December 
2004), online: CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/department/media/releases/2004/0420-pre. 
asp>.
69 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R. 2002-227 as am. [IRPR],
70 STCA, supra note 2, preamble.
71 Ibid. at Art. 4.1. The “country of last presence” is defined in Article 1(a) of the STCA as 
“that country, being either Canada or the United States, in which the refugee claimant was 
physically present immediately prior to making a refugee status claim at a land border port 
of entry.”
72 Ibid. at Art. 4.2.
As noted above, the Canadian government implemented the STCA through 
amendments to the IRPR. Section 159.3 of the IRPR designates the U.S. as a safe third 
country that complies with the non-refoulement provisions of the Refugee Convention 
and the CAT.73 At the moment, the U.S. is the only country designated by Canada as a 
safe third country. Prior to the publication of the regulations, the federal government 
consulted a number of stakeholders, including “the UNHCR [the office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees], the Immigration and Refugee Board, the 
Canadian Bar Association and human rights and refugee advocacy groups.”74 Many 
of these organizations seriously questioned whether the U.S. was in effect a safe third 
country for refugee claimants and highlighted problematic issues within the U.S. 
refugee determination system, such as the detainment of claimants, time-limits for 
making claims, and the possibility of widespread recourse to human smuggling.75
The Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) has consistently objected to the 
STCA since its inception. In 2002, Kemi Jacobs, President of the CCR, characterized 
the STCA as the “None Is Too Many Agreement” and argued that it would exacerbate 
the administrative inefficiency of the refugee determination system and increase 
human smuggling.76 In a policy paper issued in 2006, the CCR supported its argument 
that the U.S. was not a safe third country for refugees by noting its violation of the 
non-refoulement provisions in the Refugee Convention and the CAT, as well as its 
tarnished human rights record.77 The CCR pointed to the Governor in Council’s failure 
to ensure the continuing review of U.S. policy and practices and urged that, upon 
proper consideration of these issues, its designation as a safe third country for refugees 
should be withdrawn. The organization’s concerns were also articulated in a brief 
provided to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration in 
February 2007.78 As outlined later in the paper, the controversy over the legitimacy of 
the STCA culminated in proceedings before the Federal Court.
Canada and the U.S. were obligated to produce a one-year report following 
the implementation of the STCA. The report was issued in November 2006 and it
73 IRPR, supra note 70 at s. 159.3.
74 Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, C. Gaz. 2004.
II, online: Canada Gazette, http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partll/2004/20041103/html/sor217-e. 
html [Gazette].
75 Ibid
76 Jacobs, supra note 27 at 33.
77 CCR, “Less Safe Than Ever: Challenging the Designation of the U.S. as a Safe Third Country 
for Refugees” (November 2006), online: CCR < http://www.ccrweb.ca/Lesssafe.pdC> at 37.
78 CCR, “Brief to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration” (16 February 
2007), online: CCR < http://www.ccrweb.ca/s3cfeb07.html>.
determined that the Agreement had been implemented successfully.79 The report 
noted that, in monitoring the implementation process, the UNHCR had reached the 
following conclusion:
.. .the Agreement has generally been implemented by the Parties according 
to its terms, and with regard to those terms, international refugee law. 
Individuals who request protection are generally given an adequate 
opportunity to lodge refugee claims at the ports of entry (POE) and 
eligibility determinations under the Agreement have generally been made 
correctly.80
In addition to this general assessment, the report provided statistical figures 
regarding the impact of the STCA upon the number of refugee claims in Canada and 
the U.S. and highlighted how various issues were dealt with by the parties.
As expected, the STCA had a far more severe impact upon individuals seeking 
to enter Canada from the U.S. in order to make refugee claims.81 When compared with 
figures from 2004, the total number of refugee claims made in Canada decreased by 
twenty-three percent (19,735) in 2005, with fifty-five percent fewer refugee claims 
(4,033) being made at the land border.82 The vast majority of individuals (3,254) who 
made claims at the land border were found eligible for exceptions to the STCA, with
79 CIC, “A Partnership for Protection One Year Review”, Canada Chapter, (November 2006), 
online: CIC < http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/laws-policy/partnership/chapter4. 
asp > [CIC, Partnership]. See: Index, online: CIC <http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/ 
laws-policy/partnership/index.asp>.
80 Ibid. See: Summary, online: CIC < http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/laws-policy/ 
partnership/summary.asp>.
81 Ibid. See: United States Chapter, online: CIC < http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/ 
laws-policy/partnership/chapter5.asp> [CIC, Partnership, U.S. Chapter], The STCA had 
a negligible impact upon the number refugee claims made in the U.S. at the land border. 
In 2005, 66 claims were made at the land border, which was consistent with figures from 
previous years. Sixty-two claimants were returned to Canada pursuant to the STCA. The 
report highlighted the matter of detainment and noted issues such as access to communication 
services. The U.S. rejected a UNHCR recommendation to stop applying the “direct back” 
policy, preferring instead to limit its use. In addition, the U.S. demonstrated a commitment 
to confirming “both the [refugee] applicant’s valid legal status in the country to which he or 
she is being directed back, and the ability of the individual to appear for his or her scheduled 
interview.” A UNHCR recommendation to establish an administrative review process for 
reconsidering decisions under the STCA was rejected by the U.S. for similar reasons as those 
put forward by Canada.
82 Ibid. See Canada Chapter, Statistics Section, online: CIC < http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/ 
department/laws-policy/partnership/chapter4.asp#c>.
303 claimants being returned to the U.S.83 Women represented forty-seven percent 
of the claimants at the land border and the “preliminary gender impact analysis” 
determined that the STCA did not have a differential impact based on gender. The 
issue of the intersection of gender and sexual minority status was not contemplated 
within the report.
2.4 Impact of the STCA upon Sexual Minority Claimants
In Canadian Council fo r  Refugees v. Canada a refugee claimant from Colombia and 
three non-governmental organizations (the applicants) challenged the validity of the 
STCA by filing an application for judicial review before the Federal Court.84 While 
the claimant was not seeking asylum on the basis of his sexual orientation, several 
arguments were put forward regarding the detrimental impact of the STCA upon 
sexual minorities. The applicants were initially successful in obtaining a declaration of 
invalidity with respect to the designation of the U.S. as a safe third country; however, 
the Court’s finding was eventually overturned on appeal.85 Justice Noël of the Federal 
Court of Appeal defined the central issue as whether the relevant regulations and the 
STCA were ultra vires the IRPA.86 In narrowing the scope of review, the appellate 
court failed to address the arguments made regarding the impact of the STCA upon 
sexual minority claimants.
The Federal Court of Appeal determined that the lower court had erred 
in finding “that the designation of the U.S. as a safe third country and the related 
Regulations were outside the authority of the GIC or that the Safe Third Country 
Agreement between Canada and the U.S. was illegal.”87 Justice Noël noted that the 
Governor in Council had considered the factors listed in section 102 in designating 
the U.S. as a safe third country and that “there was nothing left to be reviewed 
judicially.”88 It was also found that the Governor in Council had fulfilled its duty of 
ongoing review under subsection 102(2) of the IRPA. Finally, the Court refused to 
answer any arguments related to the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, given 
that they lacked a proper factual foundation. In response to the appellate decision, 
Gloria Nafziger of Amnesty International commented:
83 Ibid. Number of claimants who qualified for each exception: family in Canada -  1,577; 
temporary suspension of removal due to generalized risk- 1,218; capital punishment -  0; 
unaccompanied minor -  49; possessed Canadian visa -  373; and no Canadian visa required 
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84 2007 FC 1262, [C.C.R.\.
85 Canada v. Canadian Council for Refugees, 2008 FCA229 [C.C.R. (FCA)].
86 Ibid C.C.R. (FCA) at para. 64.
87 Ibid. at para. 82.
88 Ibid. at para. 78.
Sadly the court chose to focus on the scope of the review and questioned 
the right of the petitioners to bring forward such a challenge, rather than 
on the human rights issues at stake for refugees...The evidence shows 
that [the] United States falls short of its responsibilities to protect refugees 
under international law. It fell short of those responsibilities on the 
day the Agreement was signed, and has continued to fall short of these 
responsibilities to this day.89
Nafziger’s statement highlights the Federal Court of Appeal’s failure to engage in 
substantive analysis of the STCA’s impact on refugees.
Ultimately, the validity of the SCTA was upheld by the courts and the 
Agreement remains operative. The Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal 
the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in February 2009. Regardless of the result 
in this case, there is evidence that the STCA has a particularly negative impact upon 
sexual minority refugee claimants. Three important issues are: the preclusion of 
refugee claims under the one-year time bar, difficulties with claiming an exemption 
under the STCA, and the exclusion of same-sex partners from family reunification 
initiatives under U.S. law.
(i) One-Year Time Bar
The American refugee determination system applies a mandatory one-year time bar to 
refugee claims.90 Claimants must therefore apply for refugee status within one year of 
arriving in the U.S., subject to a few exceptions. Claimants who seek refugee status 
after the one-year period are only eligible to obtain “withholding of removal,” which is 
a less secure status that requires a higher standard of proof.91 Numerous stakeholders, 
including lawyers, representatives from non-governmental organizations, and legal
89 See: Canadian Council of Refugees. “Rights Groups Express Dismay with Appeal Court 
Ruling on Safe Third Country,” News Release (2 July 2008), online: CCR < http://www. 
ccrweb.ca/eng/media/pressreleases/02july08.htm>.
90 The Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.C. 8 s. 208(2)(b) (1996) states: Time limit. 
- Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien unless the alien 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 
year after the date of alien’s arrival in the United States.
91 Individuals applying for “withholding of removal” who are unable to establish past 
persecution are subject to a higher standard of proof for establishing the likelihood of future 
persecution. The standard is described as “more likely than not.” See: 8 C.F.R. s. 208.16
(b) (2) (2004). In contrast, the standard of proof for regular asylum seekers under U.S. law 
is significantly lower. The standard has been described as follows: “Instead of requiring that 
persecution be more likely than not, the Supreme Court relied on authority stating that even 
a one in ten chance (and possibly less) of facing future persecution should be sufficient to 
warrant a well-founded fear.” See: Neilson, supra note 46 at 237-238. Individuals who obtain 
“withholding of removal status” also have a less secure legal status in the U.S. because they 
lack the right to permanent residence, are unable to petition for relatives to join them, and 
cannot obtain refugee travel documents.
scholars, have commented upon the effect of the one-year time bar upon sexual 
minority claimants. Victoria Neilson, Legal Director for Immigration Equality 
(formerly known as the Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force), issued the 
following statement on behalf of the organization prior to the implementation of the 
STCA:
We are especially concerned that for LGBT and HIV-positive asylum 
seekers who may not be aware that they are eligible to apply for asylum and 
therefore miss the one year filing deadline under U.S. law will never have 
an opportunity to obtain a fair hearing on their claims. For many LGBT 
asylum seekers, Canada has been the only option after missing the one year 
filing deadline.92
Neilson’s statement illustrates how sexual minority claimants are particularly 
disadvantaged by the STCA, given that they are more likely to miss the U.S. filing 
deadline and lose the opportunity to make a claim in Canada.
As noted in the previous section, both the Board and reviewing courts recognize 
that a number of factors can contribute to the failure of sexual minority claimants to 
seek asylum in a safe third country. These factors include severe psychological trauma 
resulting from persecution, lack of familiarity with the refugee determination process, 
and personal struggles with sexual orientation or gender identity. Victoria Neilson 
relayed an example of this reality in an affidavit submitted by the applicants for the 
Federal Court’s consideration in C.C.R. :
For example, last fall I was contacted by an HIV positive gay man from 
Venezuela. He had filed his asylum application approximately 18 months 
after he arrived in the United States. Although he suffered from depression, 
his lawyer never submitted a brief arguing that the applicant qualified 
for an exception to the one-year filing deadline. The applicant had been 
raped so violently by a Venezuelan policeman who made vile, homophobic 
comments, that he required rectal surgery after the attack. Nonetheless, the 
applicant lost his asylum case and his immigration appeal. He was able to 
cross the border to Canada days before the implementation of the Safe Third 
Country Agreement. In May 2005, his application for refugee status was 
granted in Canada. He would have been removed to Venezuela had he not 
been able to seek protection in Canada.93
92 Immigration Equality, Press Release, “New ‘Safe Haven’ Rules May Endanger Asylum 
Seekers, Says Immigration Equality”, (30 November 2004), online: Immigration Equality < 
http://www.immigrationequality.org/uploadedfiles/Safe%20Third-Country.pdf>.
93 Affidavit Neilson, supra note 54 at para. 7.
This example demonstrates how the effects of persecution, including severe physical 
trauma and depression, can impact the ability of sexual minorities to apply for refugee 
status within the one-year limit, placing them at risk of refoulement to persecution.
The Federal Court has acknowledged the challenges facing sexual minorities 
in meeting the U.S. time limit for refugee claims. The lower court decision in C.C.R. 
noted the applicants’ evidence regarding the disproportionate impact of the time bar 
upon gender-based and sexual minority claimants and stated:
These claimants are more likely to delay their claims because of a lack of 
information and because of the shame these types of claimants often feel.
The Applicants make solid theoretical arguments about why this bar would 
have a disproportionate impact.94
In this instance, the Court recognized how the particular situation of sexual minority 
claimants could make them more vulnerable to the time limitations under U.S. law.
The international community of refugee law scholars has become increasingly 
concerned with alternate refuge or protection elsewhere measures such as the STCA. 
The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere are the product of the Colloquium 
on Challenges in International Refugee Law held at the University of Michigan Law 
School in November 2006.95 These guidelines attempt to formulate a framework for 
the proper transfer of refugees pursuant to safe third country agreements. Article 4 of 
the guidelines states:
Unless the receiving state acknowledges the refugee status of the person 
to be transferred or will in fact ensure that all rights set by Arts. 2-34 
of the Convention are granted to him or her without need for recognition 
of refugee status, every transfer of protection responsibility must be 
predicated on a commitment by the receiving state to afford the person 
transferred a meaningful legal and factual opportunity to make his or her 
claim to protection. The sending state must in particular satisfy itself that 
the receiving state interprets refugee status in a manner that respects the 
true and autonomous meaning of the refugee definition set by Art. 1 of the 
Convention.96
Building upon Article 4 of the Michigan Guidelines, legal scholar Michelle Foster 
argues that in safe third country agreements “where the third state does not have an 
adequate status determination system, there is a risk that returning or transferring a
94 C.C.R., supra note 85 at para. 162.
95 James C. Hathaway, “The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere” (2007) 28 Mich. J. 
Int’l. L. 207 [Hathaway, Protection],
96 Ibid. at Article 4.
refugee to that state would involve indirect refoulement contrary to Article 33” of 
the Refugee Convention.97 In support of this argument Foster cites a study by Audrey 
Macklin, which notes that procedures in the U.S., such as the one-year time bar, 
create “a risk of indirect refoulement when refugees are transferred from Canada 
to the United States.”98 The inability of sexual minority claimants to seek refugee 
status in Canada after having their claims barred in the U.S. due to time is therefore 
a serious consequence of the STCA which could potentially lead to their refoulement 
to persecution.
(ii) Exemptions under the STCA
Refugee claimants may seek an exemption from the application of the STCA on a 
number of grounds, including the presence of family members in Canada. Sexual 
minorities with a spouse in Canada are eligible for an exemption under the STCA. This 
category of exemption can, however, raise particular difficulties for such claimants. In 
order to be eligible under this exemption, refugee claimants must disclose their sexual 
orientation or gender identity to border authorities, as well as the presence of their 
spouse living in Canada. This requirement can be problematic for individuals who 
find it difficult to disclose these aspects of their identity.99
There are many reasons why refugee claimants may feel uncomfortable 
telling border authorities about their sexual orientation or gender identity. Individuals 
may be reluctant to disclose this information for fear of retaliation from homophobic 
border authorities. They may have been treated harshly by authorities in their home 
states, struggle with feelings of confusion and shame over their identity, or experience 
internalized homophobia. Sexual minorities therefore face particular challenges in 
accessing exemptions from the STCA that could give them access to the Canadian 
refugee determination system.
(iii) Family Reunification
Sexual minorities making refugee claims in the U.S. are unable to benefit from family 
reunification initiatives, since federal legislation such as the Defence o f  M arriage Act
97 Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to 
Seek Protection in Another State” (2008) 28:2 Mich. J. Int’l L. 223 at 249.
98 Ibid. at 249, FN 107, citing: Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the 
Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (2005) 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 365 at 402- 
405.
99 This criticism of the STCA was made by El-Farouk Khaki, a refugee lawyer in Toronto, 
during the following panel: “Sexual Diversity Panel on Human Rights and Refugee Law 
Issues” (28 October 2008) McGill University.
precludes the possibility of recognizing same-sex partners as spouses.100 Therefore, 
successful sexual minority refugee claimants in the U.S. are unable to sponsor partners 
who may face continuing persecution in their home states. Victoria Neilson provides 
an example of a transgender refugee claimant whose claim was accepted by the U.S., 
but who could not protect his partner from further persecution by sponsoring her.101 
Same-sex couples making refugee claims in the U.S. are also treated in a differential 
manner, as they do not benefit from the opportunity afforded to heterosexual couples 
to put forward joint claims. Neilson explains the situation as follows:
Whereas a married heterosexual couple would pursue their claims together, 
and if only one of the claims met the asylum standard, both spouses could 
remain in the United States, gay couples must put forward their asylum 
cases individually. Thus, for example, I recently met with a gay couple 
from Colombia both of whom are in removal proceedings in front of 
different immigration judges. One of the men is HIV positive and had 
suffered past persecution on account of his sexual orientation. The other 
man is HIV negative and has no evidence of past persecution. It is likely 
that the claim of the HIV positive man with evidence of past persecution 
will prevail while his partner will be ordered removed.102
Couples seeking refugee status in the U.S. based on their sexual orientation or gender 
identity are therefore clearly disadvantaged under U.S. law.
The principle of family reunification informs much of Canadian immigration 
policy.103 This principle is expressly articulated in paragraph 3(2)(/) of the IRPA, 
which states:
100 Defence of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (providing that, for the purposes of federal 
law, ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife). It is 
also notable that the UNHCR recommended that the U.S. use the public interest exception 
(Article 6 of the STCA) to include same-sex partners. In rejecting this recommendation, the 
U.S. government noted that its federal law ruled out the possibility of including same-sex 
partnerships within the definition of the term “spouse.” See: CIC, Partnership, United States 
Chapter, online: CIC < http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/laws-policy/partnership/ 
chapter5.asp>.
101 Affidavit Neilson, supra note 54 at para. 11.
102 Ibid. at para. 12.
103 Nicole LaViolette, “Coming out to Canada: The Immigration of Same-Sex Couples Under 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act” (2004) 49 McGill LJ. 969 at 971.
(2) The objectives of this Act with 
respect to refugees are
(2) S’agissant des réfugiés, la présente
loi a pour objet :
(f) to support the self-sufficiency and 
the social and economic well-being of 
refugees by facilitating reunification 
with their family members in Canada;
(f) d’encourager l’autonomie et le bien- 
être socioéconomique des réfugiés 
en facilitant la réunification de leurs 
familles au Canada;
Canadian refugee law facilitates the family reunification of refugees via 
the joint application and sponsorship processes. The STCA also facilitates family 
reunification through a number of exemptions, however this goal is compromised in 
cases where sexual minority claimants do not disclose the existence of spouses in 
Canada for various reasons.
Pursuant to the Board’s rules of procedure, refugee claims involving certain 
designated family members must be heard jointly. For example, the claims of spouses 
or common-law partners must be heard together.104 The main benefit of this provision 
is that both individuals are eligible for refugee status if one is found to be a genuine 
refugee, therein upholding the principle of family reunification. Same-sex relationships 
are legally recognized under Canadian law, unlike in the majority of the U.S., where 
the recent election results reflect the country’s hostility toward recognizing the family 
ties of sexual minorities.105 Therefore, sexual minority couples are eligible to have 
their refugee claims heard jointly in Canada. Sexual minorities accepted as refugees 
in Canada are also eligible to apply to sponsor a family member who is still abroad, 
such as their spouse or common-law partner.106 This option is not available to sexual 
minority claimants in the U.S.
The effect of the one-year time bar and the inability to reunite with family 
members upon sexual minority claimants is severe, as it can result in indirect 
refoulement to persecution or continued persecution of a successful claimant’s spouse. 
In addition, the principle of family reunification is breached where sexual minority 
claimants are deflected to a country where they are unable to sponsor their partners 
or have their claims heard jointly. There are therefore strong arguments in support of
104 Refugee Protection Division Rules, r. 49(1): “The Division must join the claims of a claimant 
to a claim made by the claimant’s spouse or common-law partner, child, parent, brother, 
sister, grandchild or grandparent.”
105 McKinley, supra note 52.
i°6 irpa, SUp ra note 4 at s. 13(1) states: “A Canadian citizen or permanent resident may, subject 
to the regulations, sponsor a foreign national who is a member of the family class.” A “family 
member” is defined in s. 1(3) of IRPR, supra note 70, and includes “the spouse or common 
law partner of the person.” Section 1(1) of the IRPR defines “common law partner” as “an 
individual who is cohabiting with the person in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited 
for a period of at least one year.”
the assertion that sexual minority claimants suffer disproportionately as a result of the 
STCA.
III. INTERNAL FLIGHT ALTERNATIVES
Determinations made by the Board regarding the availability of internal flight 
alternatives to refugee claimants are another manifestation of the alternate refuge 
requirement.107 This part of the paper explains the role of IFA findings within the 
Canadian refugee determination system and discusses their impact on claims made 
by sexual minorities. Decisions involving sexual minority claimants hailing from 
Mexico are used to illustrate the analysis because they constitute a large proportion of 
sexual minority claims processed within the Canadian refugee determination system.108 
In addition, the Board’s policy response with respect to the availability of IFAs to 
Mexican claimants reveals problems with its analysis of the issue. It is therefore 
important to evaluate the effectiveness of the Board’s approach to these claims as a 
way of examining the issues that will arise when IFAs are raised in claims from other 
countries.
An IFA may be defined as an alternate location within a refugee claimant’s 
home state where he or she may seek protection from persecution. For example, 
individuals may genuinely fear persecution in their village, but could potentially seek
107 While the term “internal flight alternative” is used by Board members and the judiciary, 
other terms have been suggested for the concept, such as the “internal relocation alternative” 
and the “internal protection alternative” (See: UNHCR, “Summary Conclusions - Internal 
Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative,” in Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR s Global Consultations on International Protection, Erika Feller, Volker Turk and 
Frances Nicholson, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 418 [Feller]. 
Refugee law scholar James Hathaway advocates the use of the term “internal protection 
alternative,” since it focuses upon the availability of “true internal protection” within a 
claimant’s home state as a ground for refusing a refuge claim. (See: James C. Hathaway 
and Michelle Foster, “Internal protection/relocation/flight alternative as an aspect of refugee 
status determination” in Feller, cited above [Hathaway, Internal Protection]. For the purposes 
of this paper, the term “internal flight alternative” or IFA will be used, which accords with the 
terminology used in Canadian case law and tribunal decisions.
108 Mexican claimants represent the majority of refugee claims in Canada, about twelve percent 
of the overall number of claims. See: Radio Canada archives, online: <http://www.radio- 
canada.ca/Actualite/v2/tj22h/archivell3_200805.shtml>. Mexico has surpassed China 
as the leading source of refugees processed within Canada. In 2006, 4,953 refugee claims 
were made by individuals from Mexico and, mid-way through 2007, 3,090 claims had been 
made by Mexican claimants (See: Jessica Rafuse, “Rumour of open-door policy drawing 
claimants, lawyer says” The Globe and Mail (22 September 2007) at A 10. Mexico is also 
a leading source of refugee claims based on sexual orientation. From January 2000 to 
December 2003, the majority of refugee claims (602) based on sexual orientation came from 
Mexico. See: Marina Jimenez, “Gay refugees seek haven in Canada” The Globe and Mail 
(25 April 2004), online: Globe and Mail: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/ 
RTGAM.20040423.wrefugee24/BNStory/Front/>.
protection in a larger city within their home states. As noted by Ninette Kelley, former 
member of the Board, the consideration of an IFA is a relatively recent development 
within the refugee determination process. Kelley asserts that while, traditionally, it 
was sufficient for refugee claimants to establish a well-founded fear of persecution 
in their local area, decision-makers are now using the availability of IFAs to restrict 
eligibility for refugee status.109 The Refugee Convention does not explicitly refer to the 
availability of an IFA to refugee claimants, but the Federal Court of Appeal has stated 
that “the IFA concept is inherent in the Convention refugee definition.”110 As a result, 
it has become an important issue in many refugee decisions.
IFA considerations may be characterized as “an extension of the concept of 
state protection.”111 While some legal scholars find that the availability of an IFA is 
relevant to establishing a well-founded fear of persecution, James Hathaway argues 
that the IFA analysis is “relevant to the question [of] whether national protection is 
available to counter the well-founded fear shown to exist in the applicant’s region 
of origin.”112 Pursuant to this analysis, once a refugee claimant’s well-founded fear 
of persecution has been established, the Board must consider whether he or she may 
obtain state protection in the region from which he or she fled, or in a different location 
within his or her home state (an IFA).
Refugee claimants, who bear the onus of disproving the availability of an 
IFA, must be given the opportunity to respond to the matter.113 While as a matter of 
procedural fairness refugee claimants must be given sufficient notice that the issue will 
be raised, case law regarding the scope of such notice is contradictory. According to 
Kelley, the best practice is to advise the refugee claimant of the particular locations 
that will be considered as potential IFAs.114
109 Ninette Kelley, “Internal Flight/Relocation/Protection Alternative: Is it Reasonable?” (2002)
14 Int’l. J. Refugee L. 4 at 4-5.
110 Rasaratnam v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1992] 1 F.C. 706, 140 N.R. 138 (C.A.) at para. 6. 
[Rasaratnam].
111 Nicole LaViolette, “Independent Human Rights Documentation and Sexual Minorities: An 
Ongoing Challenge for the Canadian Refugee Determination Process” (2009) 13 Int’l J.H.R. 
437 [LaViolette, Independent].
112 Hathaway, Internal Protection, supra note 109 at 381.
113 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1994] 1 F.C. 589, (1993) 109 D.L.R. (4th) 682 (C.A.) 
at para. 10.
114 Kelley, supra note 111 at 11, wherein Kelley states: “In light of these conflicting decisions, 
what is the better view? The answer lies in the recognition that as a matter of natural justice, 
the claimant should know the case he or she has to meet...To be effective notice, an area 
of proposed IFA must be specific and the claimant must be provided with an opportunity to 
prepare an adequate response.” This position accords with that put forward in the Michigan 
Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative. See James C. Hathaway, “International 
Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative” (1999) 21 
Mich. J. Int’l. L. 131 at 140 [Hathaway, Guidelines IPA].
In Rasaratnam  v. Canada (M.E.I.), the Federal Court of Appeal established 
the following two-prong test for assessing the availability of an IFA:
In my opinion, in finding the IFA, the Board was required to be satisfied, 
on a balance of probabilities, that there was no serious possibility of the 
appellant being persecuted in Colombo and that, in all the circumstances 
including circumstances particular to him, conditions in Colombo were 
such that it would not be unreasonable for the appellant to seek refuge 
there.115
There are therefore two important issues in determining the validity of an IFA. First, 
the Board must consider whether there is a serious possibility of the refugee claimant 
being persecuted in the IFA; secondly, the reasonability of relocation to an IFA must be 
evaluated in light of a claimant’s particular circumstances and conditions in the IFA. 
In cases where the Board finds a valid IFA, the refugee claim is denied. IFA findings 
may therefore trump otherwise valid refugee claims.
3.1 IFAs and Sexual Minority Claimants
The availability of IFAs to sexual minority refugee claimants is a contentious matter. 
Nicole LaViolette provides the following rationale for the increasing saliency of IFA 
findings to refugee claims involving sexual minorities:
Social, political, and legal progress is sometimes highly localized in a 
State; more tolerant destinations may therefore constitute an IFA for gay 
men, lesbians, bisexuals or transgender people. In addition, meaningful 
protection in a different area of the country may indeed be available to an 
asylum-seeker in situations where the individual is being persecuted by a 
non-governmental entity acting independently of any governmental control 
or support. As mentioned above, private persecution is regularly raised in 
cases brought forth by members of sexual minorities.116
Significant progress in certain areas of a state, such as larger and more cosmopolitan 
cities, may therefore result in the provision of adequate protection to sexual minorities. 
Accordingly, the availability of IFAs in such locations has become a dominant issue in 
cases involving sexual minority claimants.
Increased awareness of the availability of IFAs in more progressive regions 
of refugee-producing countries prompted a particular policy response from the Board. 
In light of localized socio-political progress in Mexico, Gaétan Cousineau, Deputy 
Chairperson of the Board, designated the decision in Gutierrez v. Canada (M.C.I.) as
115 Rasaratnam, supra note 112 at para. 10.
116 LaViolette, Independent, supra note 113.
a “persuasive decision” in 2006.117 Persuasive decisions serve as informal guidelines 
for reasoning in similar cases. The Board’s policy with respect to persuasive decisions 
is as follows:
Persuasive Decisions are decisions that have been identified by a Division 
head as being of persuasive value in developing the jurisprudence of the 
Division. They are decisions that decision-makers are encouraged to rely 
upon in the interests of consistency and collegiality.
The application of persuasive decisions by the Division enables the Division 
to move toward a consistent and transparent application of questions of law 
or of mixed law and fact. Their designation promotes efficiency in the 
hearing and reasons writing process by making use of quality work done by 
colleagues within the tribunal.
Unlike Jurisprudential Guides, decision-makers are not required to 
explain their decision not to apply a persuasive decision in appropriate 
circumstances. Their application is voluntary.118
Gutierrez was designated as being relevant to the availability of an IFA to 
Mexican claimants seeking refugee status on the basis of their sexual orientation. 
The case involved a gay couple from Guadalajara who fled Mexico after allegedly 
being verbally and physically abused by family members and detained by the police. 
In considering the availability of an IFA to the claimants in Mexico City, the Board 
pointed to evidence that the gay subculture was represented in government, legislation 
was passed banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gay and lesbian 
organizations were spreading, larger cities were more tolerant of sexual minorities, 
and political activism such as gay pride parades and protests took place in larger 
cities.119 Overall, the Board concluded that both prongs of the IFA test (serious harm 
and reasonability of relocation) were satisfied and the claims were denied.
In May 2008, Ken Sandhu, Deputy Chairperson of the Board, revoked the 
designation of Gutierrez as a persuasive decision. The reasons for its revocation were 
stated in the following policy note:
The decision in TA4-10802/03 was identified as having persuasive value 
regarding the availability of an internal flight alternative in Mexico for 
refugee claimants whose claims are based on the Convention ground
117 [2005] R.P.D.D. No. 179 (QL) [Gutierrez]. Since the withdrawal of Gutierrez as a persuasive 
decision, it no longer appears in online databases or on the IRB website.
118 IRB, “Persuasive Decisions”, online: IRB <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/ 
persuasive/index_e.htm>.
1,9 Gutierrez, supra note 119 at paras. 13-19.
of membership in a particular social group on the basis of sexual 
orientation.
Over time, the evidence on which the above noted decisions was based 
may have become dated and the reasoning in the decisions, based on the 
evidence, may no longer have persuasive value relevant to more recent 
claims.120
The designation and subsequent revocation of Gutierrez as a persuasive 
decision illustrates a number of problems with the Board’s IFA analysis. IFA findings 
are determinative of refugee claims and should only be considered once persecution 
in the claimant’s local area has been established. The designation of Gutierrez is, 
however, evidence of a trend in the Board’s reasoning whereby IFAs have become 
the primary issue in cases involving sexual minorities. Furthermore, the revocation 
of Gutierrez demonstrates that persuasive decisions are ill-suited for informing the 
Board’s IFA analysis. The test for finding an IFA requires the Board to consider 
evidence regarding a claimant’s personal circumstances, as well as current country 
conditions. Since country conditions may change over time, the evidence relied upon 
in designating a persuasive decision may lose currency and become irrelevant to 
subsequent IFA determinations. This problem is addressed in the context of the issues 
examined below.
The following issues are explored in considering the impact of the Board’s 
IFA analysis upon sexual minority claimants: the Board’s reliance upon the discretion 
requirement, the nature of the agents of persecution, and problems regarding objective 
evidence of country conditions.
(i) Discretion Requirement
The relevance of acting discreetly to avoid persecution in one’s home state is an issue 
that has been raised in relation to refugee claims made by sexual minorities.121 Under 
Canadian law, sexual minority claimants are not required to act discreetly to avoid
120 IRB, “Policy Note: Notice of Revocation of Persuasive Policy Decisions” (8 May 2008), online: 
IRB <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/polnotes/rev_ta417681 10800203 18833 e. 
htm>.
121 See Christopher Kendall, “Lesbian and Gay Refugees in Australia: Now that ‘Acting 
Discreetly’ is no Longer an Option, will Equality be Forthcoming?” (2003) 15:4 Int’l J. 
Refugee L.715 at 718, wherein he states: “Homophobia aims to ensure that women and men 
do not violate those gendered norms central to patriarchal power structures and that lesbians 
and gay mean are suppressed, silenced, made invisible to the extent that their relationships 
and sexuality do so. Given this, any decision that requires ‘discretion’, for which, read silence 
and invisibility, in order to avoid abuse does little more than prop up those inequalities that 
the Convention seeks to address and which are the core of both homophobia and sexism.”
persecution.122 Nevertheless, it appears that the Board sometimes considers the issue 
of discretion in the context of IFA findings involving sexual minority claimants. In 
Perez v. Canada (M. C.I.), the Board’s IFA analysis included the consideration of a gay 
refugee claimant’s prior cautious behaviour in concealing his sexuality, as well as his 
masculine appearance. The Board stated:
Finally, when the claimant was asked whether he could live elsewhere in 
Mexico, such as Mexico City, he said he would have to start all over again and 
that he would have to be respected.. .In addition, according to the claimant, 
he was always careful not to publicly display his sexual orientation. This 
means that, since he would not be considered to be effeminate (afeminados) 
or to be a cross-dresser, he would not be particularly targeted in Mexico 
City. The panel finds that internal flight is a realistic and achievable 
alternative for the claimant, particularly in view of the claimant’s previous 
experience in Gueretaro.
Furthermore, the panel finds that...he has an internal flight alternative 
elsewhere in Mexico, specifically, Mexico City, since he has not publicly 
displayed his sexual orientation.123
Relying on these conclusions, the Board held that Mexico City was a viable IFA for 
this discreet gay refugee claimant.
This approach is problematic for a number of reasons. It is premised upon 
a requirement that is not valid under Canadian law, that of requiring sexual minority 
claimants to act discreetly. Acting discreetly is often a means of self-preservation
122 See X.M.U. (Re), [1995] C.R.D.D. No. 146 (QL) at para. 102-104. See also Kendall, supra 
note 123 at 740, wherein the author states: “Donald G. Caswell of the University of Victoria, 
for example, upon reviewing the jurisprudence on this issue, has concluded that ‘a lesbian 
or gay man is certainly not expected to hide their sexual orientation in order to be safe 
somewhere in their country’.”
123 [2004] R.P.D.D. No. 78 (QL) at paras. 19-21.
for sexual minorities; it is a way to avoid persecution.124 As such, requiring a refugee 
claimant to continue concealing his or her sexual orientation directly violates basic 
principles of refugee law. Refugees should not have to suppress basic human rights to 
avoid persecutory acts. An IFA is supposed to constitute a safe alternate location for a 
refugee claimant, one in which he or she might live free of persecution. Forcing sexual 
minorities to act discreetly is in itself a distinct form of oppression.125 It is therefore 
perverse to found an IFA finding upon a presumption of past or future discretion in a 
given location.
The Board’s finding in Perez does not appear to be an isolated case. In PL.L. 
(Re), the Board determined that a refugee claimant’s “sexual orientation would not 
even be suspected in the workplace if he preferred to keep it a private matter.”126 
This finding was made in support of the availability of an IFA in Mexico City. The 
discretion requirement is therefore informing the Board’s IFA analysis in a manner 
that is undermining refugee claims. Claimants are essentially being punished for their 
ability to “pass” as heterosexual in a different region of their country.127 As noted 
by Jenni Millbank, sometimes being too private about one’s sexual identity can lead 
decision-makers to deny refugee claims on the basis that the harm they have suffered 
does “not qualify as persecution and will be regarded as merely private and/or readily 
avoided.”128 Millbank concludes that “discretion reasoning [has] led to the assumption 
that applicants would be safe in a big city because no-one will know they are gay (and
124 In S395 v. Minister o f Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2003] HCA 71 at para. 43 (9 
Dec. 2003), Justices McHugh and Kirby of the High Court of Australia made the following 
statement with respect to this issue: “The notion that it is reasonable for a person to take 
action that will avoid persecutory harm invariably leads a tribunal of fact into a failure to 
consider properly whether there is a real chance of persecution if the person is returned 
to the country of nationality. This is particularly so where the actions of the persecutors 
have already caused the person affected to modify his or her conduct by hiding his or her... 
membership in a particular social group. In cases where the applicant has modified his or 
her conduct, there is a natural tendency for the tribunal of fact to reason that, because the 
applicant has not been persecuted in the past, he or she will not be persecuted in the future. 
The fallacy underlying this approach is the assumption that the conduct of the applicant is 
uninfluenced by the conduct of the persecutor, and that the relevant persecutory conduct 
is the harm that will be inflicted. In many -  perhaps the majority of -  cases, however, the 
applicant has acted in the way he or she did only because of the threat of harm.”
125 Jenni Millbank, “A Preoccupation with Perversion: the British Response to Refugee Claims 
on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 1989-2003” (2005) 14 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 115 at 120.
126 [2005] R.P.D.D. No. 21 (QL) at para. 49.
127 The term “passing” is used to describe a practice used by some sexual minorities of 
concealing their sexual identity in order to “pass” as heterosexual in certain contexts. See: 
Brooke Kroeger, Passing: When People Can’t Be Who They Are, (Public Affairs, 2003) at 
8, where passing is described as “erasing details or certain aspects of a given life in order to 
move past perceived, suspected, or actual barriers to achieve desired ends.”
128 Millbank, Imagining, supra note 22 at 144.
they can keep it that way), rather than because it actually was safe to be gay in the big 
city.”129
The Board’s reliance upon discretion reasoning parallels early decisions that 
cited documentary evidence asserting that “there are three groups for whom an IFA 
is not possible [in Mexico]: effeminate men, HIV-positive men, and political activists 
and whistle-blowers.”130 The Board has described gay refugee claimants as “athletic” 
and “masculine” in finding that an IFA is available to them.131 This focus upon a 
refugee claimant’s effeminacy has led to the decision by at least one gay refugee 
claimant and his legal counsel to re-formulate the Convention ground asserted in his 
claim to “effeminate homosexuals.”132 The Board’s perception of the masculinity of 
lesbian refugee claimants has also been used to undermine their well-founded fear of 
persecution,133 thereby leaving open the possibility that discretion requirements might 
also be applied to IFA findings involving lesbians. The relationship between the legal 
test for an IFA and the physical appearance or demeanour of a gay or lesbian refugee 
is questionable as well as problematic since it relies upon stereotypical views of sexual 
minorities.
(ii) A gents o f  Persecution
Sexual minority claimants often report persecution at the hands of state agents 
such as the police.134Democratic states such as Mexico are, however, subject to the 
presumption of state protection under Canadian law.135 It can therefore be challenging 
for sexual minority claimants to rebut the presumption that a democratic state is 
capable of protecting its own citizens. A related issue is the ability of local police to 
continue persecuting claimants in an alternate location in the country, whether directly 
or through connections with other state agents.
129 Jenni Millbank, “From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on 
the Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom” (2009) Int’l J. H. R. 
(forthcoming).
130 V.X.Q. (Re), [2002] R.P.D.D. No. 516 (QL) at para. 11 [VX.Q. (Re)].
131 See: Valdes v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] R.P.D.D. No. 140 (QL) at para. 42.
132 See: F.N.K. (Re), [2005] R.P.D.D. No. 881 (QL) at para. 3.
133 See: P. W.Z. (Re), [2000] C.R.D.D. No. 47 (QL) at para. 6.
134 For example, in Gutierrez, supra note 119, a gay refugee couple alleged unlawful detainment 
by the police; in Martinez v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2005] R.P.D.D. No. 68 (QL), a gay refugee 
couple were allegedly beaten by police; in Parrales v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2005] R.P.D.D. 
No. 326, a lesbian refugee claimant alleged sexual assault by the police; and in Garcia v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 807, a gay claimant alleged sexual assault by the police [Garcia]. 
However, IRB research states that “Reports of police officers sexually abusing homosexuals 
were scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate,” Response to 
Information Request, MEX 102682.E (09 January 2008), online: IRB <http://www.irb-cisr. 
gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451639>.
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The UNHCR’s guidelines regarding IFAs make it clear that where the agent 
of persecution is the state, there is a presumption that its authority applies state-wide, 
thereby precluding the availability of an IFA to refugee claimants.136 With respect to 
persecution by local authorities, the UNHCR Guidelines presume that such actions are 
authorized by the state, unless there is evidence that the local authority has no presence 
outside the immediate region.137 The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection  
Alternative echo the UNHCR Guidelines in this regard:
15. First, the “internal protection alternative” must be a place in which 
the asylum-seeker no longer faces the well-founded fear of persecution for 
a Convention reason which gave rise to her or his presumptive need for 
protection against the risk in one region of the country of origin. It is not 
enough simply to find that the original agent or author of persecution has 
not yet established a presence in the proposed site of internal protection.
There must be reason to believe that the reach of the agent or author of 
persecution is likely to remain localized outside the designated place of 
internal protection.
16. There should be a strong presumption against finding an “internal 
protection alternative” where the agent or author of the original risk or 
persecution is, or is sponsored by, the national government.138
Therefore, an IFA may only be considered where there is no chance of local authorities 
extending their influence beyond their jurisdiction.
The Board generally approaches the issue of persecution by local authorities 
in Mexico from the perspective that they have little reach outside their limited 
jurisdiction. For example, in V.X. Q. (Re), the Board found it unlikely that police officers 
from Puerto Vallarta might follow the claimant to Mexico City. The Board concluded 
that an IFA was available in Mexico City, since it was within the jurisdiction of a 
different police force.139 In Orozco Gonzales v. Canada (M.C.I.), the Board found it 
unlikely that police officers from Veracruz would seek out the claimant if he relocated 
to Mexico City.140 The Board’s approach to the issue was formalized in Gutierrez, 
where the Board found that:
136 UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” 
within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, at para. 13-14. Online: UNHCR < http://www.unhcr.org/publ/ 
PUBL/3f28d5cd4.pdf> [UNHCR, Guidelines],
137 Ibid.
138 Hathaway, Guidelines IPA, supra note 116 at 137-138.
139 V.X.Q. (Re), supra note 132 at paras. 7-9.
140 [2004] R.P.D.D. No. 120 (QL) at para. 14.
.. .there is nothing before me to convince me within the preponderance of 
probabilities that the Guadalajara police officers would be able to influence 
any police response in Mexico City, which is quite obviously an entirely 
different police jurisdiction.141
The Board’s reasoning in Gutierrez therefore supported an informal presumption that 
the reach of local authorities in Mexico was limited in scope.
There are, however, cases in which the Board is willing to acknowledge 
that the boundaries of police jurisdiction in Mexico are more permeable. V.Z.D. (Re) 
involved a lesbian refugee claimant who had been stalked and attacked by her ex- 
husband and a number of local police officers he had hired as agents. The Board 
ultimately concluded that there was no IFA available to the claimants.142 Cases 
involving the federal police force are also less likely to result in positive IFA findings, 
given the force’s country-wide jurisdiction. In X.D. W (Re), the agent of persecution 
was a member of the judicial/federal police. The claimants had attempted to relocate 
from Mexico City to Guadalajara, but they were tracked down by the police, leading 
the Board to conclude that there was no IFA available to them.143
Having reviewed a number of cases involving the availability of IFAs 
to sexual minority claimants in Mexico, it appears that the Board’s approach runs 
counter to both the Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative and 
the UNHCR Guidelines noted above. In particular, the Board tends to work from the 
position that local authorities do not have a wide reach and it requires claimants to 
rebut this presumption. Claimants who can show evidence of relocation and continued 
persecution are more likely to rebut potential IFA findings. Individuals who flee their 
local region immediately and seek asylum abroad due to state persecution, however, 
face serious challenges in rebutting presumptions about the reach of local authorities.
(iii) Documentary Evidence of Country Conditions
In making IFA findings, decision-makers are called upon to weigh evidence of both 
country conditions and a claimant’s personal circumstances. It is therefore essential 
for the Board to rely upon up-to-date and accurate country information. Sexual 
minority claimants often have difficulty obtaining sufficient documentary evidence to 
bolster arguments against the viability of a particular IFA. Nicole LaViolette argues 
that the broad objectives of human rights organizations make it difficult for them to 
report upon the distinct legal criteria sought by refugee claimants in rebutting potential 
IFAs. LaViolette finds that “human rights reports rarely compare internal locations 
to determine whether a part of the country is a safer place for specific minorities or
141 Gutierrez, supra note 119 at para. 24.
142 V.Z.D. (Re), [2001] C.R.D.D. No. 37 (QL) at paras. 27 and 30.
143 X.D. W. (Re), [2006] R.P.D.D. No. 1 (QL) at para. 26.
targeted individuals.”144 The dearth of location-specific information therefore hampers 
the ability of claimants to successfully challenge IFAs.
Under Canadian law, the Board is presumed to have considered all of the 
evidence before it and is not obligated to refer to every piece of evidence in its decision. 
Where a key piece of evidence contradicts a significant finding made by the Board, 
however, the Board must provide reasons for its preference.145 For example, in Garcia 
v. Canada (M.C.I.), the Board failed to mention why evidence pertaining to the rate of 
homophobic murders in Mexico City did not influence its finding of an IFA in that city. 
Upon judicial review, the Federal Court held that:
The evidence referred to by the Board does not squarely address the 
incidence of violent crime directed at gays and lesbians in Mexico City 
because of their sexual orientation. The central issue in this case is whether 
the fact that he is an openly gay man, Mr. Garcia would be able to live 
safely in Mexico City. As such, evidence relating to homophobic crimes 
directed against gay men in that city should have been of critical concern 
to the Board.
While it might have been open to the Board to choose not to ascribe much 
weight to the Report, given that it was prepared six years before Mr. Garcia’s refugee 
hearing, in all of the circumstances, it was not open to the Board to simply ignore it.146
The result in Garcia demonstrates how the Board’s consideration of 
documentary evidence can impact the validity of its IFA findings.
The Board must also contend with the schism between a state’s official anti- 
discrimination policy with respect to sexual minorities and the lived reality of such 
individuals. One reason for the designation of Gutierrez as a persuasive decision was 
the Board’s thorough analysis of evidence pertaining to country conditions for sexual 
minorities in Mexico. The Board noted a number of legislative developments, such 
as anti-discrimination laws, which seemed to bode well for the protection of sexual 
minorities. It is important to note that Gutierrez was decided in February 2005 and that 
the decision-maker relied upon a National Documentation Package dated November 
26, 2004, even though an updated version was available at the time.147 One year later, 
in October 2006, Gutierrez was designated as a persuasive decision.
144 LaViolette, Independent, supra note 113.
145 See Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 17.
146 Garcia, supra note 136 at paras. 16-17.
147 See: H.K.T. (Re), [2007] R.P.D.D. No. 28 at para. 15 [H.K.T. (Re)], where the Board states: 
“Moreover, the panel relied, in February 2005, on a national documentation package dated 
November, 2004 (although a package dated January, 2005, was available.)”
Over time, Board members became increasingly uneasy with applying 
Gutierrez. There is evidence that as early as November 2006 certain Board members 
were relying upon more up-to-date country-condition documentation and becoming 
increasingly skeptical about the effectiveness of the legislative changes being 
implemented in Mexico. In H. W.X. (Re), the Board stated:
The panel is o f the opinion that the internal flight alternative is not a 
reasonable possibility in this case. The panel takes note of decisions TA- 
10802 and TA4-10803, which are persuasive, but in this case the claimant 
was not living in a provincial town but in Mexico City, the most tolerant city 
in the country according to the documentary evidence. Even in Mexico City, 
homophobia is still common, and although protective measures exist, they 
are, according to the document MExl01377.EF, ineffective.148
In H.K.T. (Re), the Board went further in its criticism of Gutierrez as a 
persuasive decision. The Board noted that, regardless of the legislation passed in 
order to protect sexual minorities in Mexico, little concrete change was taking place.149 
In addition, the Board refused to rely on the outdated evidence cited in Gutierrez 
and preferred to take into consideration evidence found in a more recent National 
Documentation Package. As noted above, the persuasive decision was not revoked 
until May 2008, when the Deputy Chairman of the Board acknowledged its diminished 
relevance in light of changed country conditions. It is impossible to determine how 
many refugee decisions expressly applied or rejected Gutierrez between its designation 
and revocation, since the Board does not publish all of its decisions; however, it is 
argued that Gutierrez had a significant impact upon sexual minority claims from 
Mexico and its revocation will likely weaken the informal presumption in favour of 
finding IFAs in Mexico.
IV. ANALYSIS
This part of the paper assesses the impact of alternate refuge measures upon sexual 
minority refugee claimants by analyzing common issues arising from the application 
of the safe third country rule and IFA findings to their claims. The analysis first 
highlights general problems with the current approach and then focuses on the aspects 
that systematically disadvantage sexual minority claimants. It is argued that the distinct 
nature of homophobic persecution increases the vulnerability of sexual minority 
claimants to the misapplication of the alternate refuge concept. Decision-makers must 
therefore adopt a more nuanced approach to the issue by taking into account factors 
specific to sexual minority claimants and focusing upon relevant country conditions.
148 H. W.X. (Re), [2007] R.P.D.D. No. 4 (QL) at para. 26.
149 H.K. T. (Re), supra note 149 at para. 12.
The research undertaken above reveals a number of general problems with the current 
approach to alternate refuge. The analysis will focus on three issues: credibility 
determinations made by the Board, the impact of the STCA upon refugee claimants, 
and the Board’s reasoning with respect to the reach of local authorities in making IFA 
findings.
The Board must enhance its understanding of the relationship between 
a refugee claimant’s failure to seek asylum in a safe third country and his or her 
credibility.150 As set out by the Federal Court in Ilie and Gavryushenko, failure to claim 
refugee status in a safe third country is relevant to the issue of credibility, but is not 
determinative of a refugee claim.151 Therefore, the Board must refrain from treating 
the issue as conclusive and explore any relevant factors before making a negative 
credibility finding.
Overall, the STCA has a negative impact upon refugee claimants, as it 
precludes claimants from seeking refuge in their choice of forum when they arrive at 
the Canada-U.S. land-border. Statistics show that the Agreement has a particularly 
significant impact upon individuals seeking to claim refugee status in Canada who 
have previously travelled through the U.S. In 2005, 303 refugee claimants were 
removed from Canada and returned to the U.S. pursuant to the STCA, while only 66 
claimants were removed from the U.S. and returned to Canada.152 As noted earlier, 
many refugee claimants have no choice but to travel through the U.S. prior to their 
arrival in Canada due to the nature of travel arrangements. The STCA therefore has a 
serious impact upon such claimants.
The designation of the U.S. as a safe third country under the STCA also 
calls into question Canada’s commitment to the principle of non-refoulement. The 
STCA does not take into account whether an individual making a refugee claim at the 
Canada-U.S. border is precluded from seeking refugee status in the U.S. under the 
one-year time bar. It is therefore possible that a refugee claimant who is, because of 
the time limit, barred from seeking refugee status in the U.S. could also be excluded 
from the Canadian refugee determination system under the STCA, thereby placing 
the individual at risk of refoulement to persecution. Several legal scholars, including 
those involved in developing the Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, 
have warned against the transfer of refugee claimants to a state where they may not
150 For example: see Mendez, supra note 39, where the Board treated the claimant’s failure to 
seek alternate refuge in a safe third country as determinative of his refugee claim.
151 Ilie, supra note 34; Gavryushenko, supra note 35.
152 CIC, Partnership U.S. Chapter, supra note 82.
have a meaningful opportunity to put forward their claims, thereby risking indirect 
refoulement.153
In considering the approach of decision-makers to IFAs, it becomes evident 
that the Board’s reasoning with respect to the reach of persecutory authorities is 
problematic. The UNHCR Guidelines and the Michigan Guidelines on the Internal 
Protection Alternative support the presumption that persecution by local authorities is 
authorized by the state, unless proven otherwise.154 This approach reduces the burden 
upon the refugee claimant. However, it appears that the Board has adopted the position 
that local authorities involved in persecution are unlikely to wield power outside their 
jurisdiction. Refugee claimants are therefore placed under the more onerous burden 
of having to establish that local authorities have a national reach or influence. This 
can be particularly troublesome for individuals who do not have a history of relocation 
within their home states and fled persecution immediately.
4.2 Specific Issues - Sexual Minority Claimants
In addition to the general problems noted above, there is evidence that the current 
approach to alternate refuge systematically disadvantages sexual minority claimants. 
The analysis focuses on two major issues: the relationship between homophobic 
persecution and alternate refuge considerations, and the approach taken by decision­
makers toward country conditions in determining alternate refuge issues.
(i) Homophobic Persecution
The nature of the persecution experienced by sexual minorities increases their 
vulnerability to the misapplication of alternate refuge measures. In considering the 
issue of alternate refuge, decision-makers sometimes presume that sexual minorities 
have fully embraced their sexual identity and are cognizant of the opportunity to seek 
asylum in other countries. However, homophobic persecution can force individuals 
to conceal their sexual identity, thereby forcing them to live a closeted existence in 
their home states or in transition states. In addition, sexual minorities may internalize 
societal homophobia, resulting in shame and self-loathing about their sexual identity. 
Claimants may fear self-identifying as sexual minorities and may not feel safe revealing 
this aspect of their identity to authorities in other countries. They may also have 
limited knowledge of their eligibility for refugee status on the basis of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity. These issues affect the ability of sexual minorities to 
seek asylum prior to their arrival in Canada.
The Board appears to have acknowledged many of these problems in 
its approach to credibility determinations. A set of factors has been developed in
153 See: Foster, supra note 98; Hathaway, Internal Protection, supra note 109.
154 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 138; Hathaway, Guidelines IPA supra note 116.
order determine the relevance of a sexual minority claimant’s failure to seek asylum 
in a third country to his or her overall credibility. Struggles with sexual identity, 
psychological distress, and lack of familiarity with the refugee determination system 
are key considerations undertaken more recently by the Board in evaluating credibility. 
An encouraging development took place in E.Y.W. (Re), where the Board found that 
failure to seek asylum in a safe third country due to psychological distress actually 
bolstered a sexual minority claimant’s credibility.155 It is important that this analytical 
framework be applied more consistently in future credibility determinations.
With respect to the Board’s IFA analysis, members must be watchful of using 
discretionary reasoning in assessing claims by sexual minorities. Requiring claimants 
to act discretely in an IFA does not accord with Canadian law and ignores the influence 
of homophobic persecution over the decision by sexual minority claimants to hide 
their sexual identity. The fact that a claimant has lived a closeted lifestyle or does not 
bear a stereotypically gay or lesbian appearance is not relevant to IFA findings and 
may actually be considered further evidence of government repression.
Finally, the STCA negotiated between the American and Canadian 
governments fails to account for the consequences of homophobic persecution set 
out above. Sexual minority claimants, some of whom have experienced severe 
psychological and physical trauma or have yet to come to terms with their sexual 
identity, are likely to miss the one-year deadline for filing a refugee claim in the 
U.S. Their refugee claims are therefore barred in the U.S. and cannot be processed 
in Canada if they are made at the Canada-U.S. land border. These claimants are left 
in limbo and must apply for a less secure status in the U.S., which is more difficult 
to obtain. It is argued that individuals in this situation should be exempt from the 
STCA. Canada should authorize this change as an exemption in the public interest 
under Article 6 of the STCA.
(ii) Country Conditions
The assessment of country conditions, both in a claimant’s home state and in a safe 
third country, is a pivotal aspect of refugee determinations.156 These assessments are 
particularly important with regard to the availability of alternate refuge. Decision­
155 E.Y.W. (Re), supra note 48.
156 See: Arwen Swink, “Queer Refuge: A Review of the Role of Country Condition Analysis in 
Asylum Adjudications for Members of Sexual Minorities” (2006) 29 Hastings Int’l Comp. 
L. Rev. 251 at 256, where Swink states: The ways in which a reviewing tribunal evaluates, 
or fails to evaluate, the conditions from an applicant’s country of origin have a tremendous 
impact on a claimant’s chances of success... An asylum adjudicator’s choice of independent 
sources, assessment of relative weight of those sources and understanding of the different 
social contexts faced by gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered people all weigh 
heavily in the final analysis of the likelihood that an applicant will face persecution if 
returned to the country of origin.
makers face specific challenges in evaluating country conditions in cases involving 
sexual minority claimants. These challenges often arise due to a lack of information 
regarding the plight of sexual minorities in other countries. Donald Casswell noted the 
following in a 1996 publication:
First, board panels may demand documentary evidence of sexual orientation 
persecution, unreasonably forgetting that in many countries lesbianness 
and gayness are so taboo that they are, literally, unmentionable...The 
more repressive a country is the more difficult it likely will be to obtain 
documentation concerning human rights abuses generally and about 
persecution of lesbians and gay men in particular.157
While access to information about the persecution of sexual minorities 
throughout the world may have improved, Nicole LaViolette argues that the information 
obtained by human rights organizations may not always be specific enough to meet 
the standards required under refugee law, nor is the material used by decision-makers 
always reliable.158 Both of these concerns are relevant to the Board’s IFA findings. 
Refugee claimants are often left to rebut IFA findings without adequate information 
about the availability of protection, or lack thereof, within their home states. Also, 
for a time the Board relied on an outdated persuasive decision in creating an informal 
presumption in favour of finding IFAs for sexual minorities in Mexico. Increasing 
the amount of authoritative information available regarding the country conditions 
faced by sexual minority claimants and relying on up-to-date information as to these 
conditions is essential to a fair refugee determination system in Canada.
A second problem results from the failure of decision-makers to make 
adequate inquiry into country conditions. For example, in assessing a refugee 
claimant’s credibility, the Board may consider whether he or she sought refugee 
status in any safe third country he or she travelled through prior to their arrival in 
Canada. A key question in determining this issue is whether sexual minorities are in 
fact eligible for protection within the refugee determination systems of other states. 
As established earlier, sexual minority status is not recognized as a ground of refugee 
status in every state party to the Refugee Convention. Unfortunately, the Board does 
not appear to consider this issue, or the general treatment of sexual minorities in third 
countries, when making credibility determinations. Consideration of the eligibility of 
sexual minorities for refugee status in third countries is an important factor that should 
influence the Board’s credibility analysis.
Finally, further investigation into country conditions is required in designating 
states as safe third countries. The federal government is responsible for negotiating and
157 Donald Casswell, “Lesbians, Gay Men, and Canadian Law” (Toronto: E. Montgomery, 1996) 
at 596.
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implementing safe third country agreements such as the STCA. In doing so, recourse 
must be had to evidence of country conditions in these states. Prior to designating the 
U.S. as a safe third country, the federal government conducted a study of gender-based 
refugee cases in the U.S. and determined that “Canada and the United States have 
similar approaches and both countries meet international standards on the treatment of 
gender issues.”159 Sexual minorities were not accorded similar treatment in the process 
leading up to the implementation of the STCA, as the government’s analysis failed to 
address the link between persecution on the basis of sexual orientation and gender.160 
Given that alternate refuge measures clearly disadvantage sexual minority claimants, 
it is important that their perspective form part of the consultations undertaken prior to 
the formalization of such agreements.
4.3 Conclusion
The current approach to alternate refuge systematically disadvantages sexual minority 
claimants. This research paper discussed two manifestations of the alternate refuge 
concept: the safe third country rule and IFAs. The analysis was framed under two 
broad themes: the nature of homophobic persecution and the relevance of country 
conditions. The study demonstrated how homophobic persecution and problems with 
evidence regarding country conditions serve to increase the vulnerability of sexual 
minority claimants to the misapplication of the alternate refuge concept. Decision­
makers must therefore consider factors specific to sexual minorities in determining 
alternate refuge issues.
Canada has long been at the forefront of the movement to protect the rights 
o f sexual minorities, including refugee claimants. The country has demonstrated this 
commitment by taking steps such as being the first to recognize sexual orientation 
and gender identity as a ground of refugee status and hearing the refugee claims of 
same-sex couples jointly. Canada’s current approach to the issue of alternate refuge 
threatens its reputation in this regard and puts the country at risk of participating in 
the practice of refoulement to persecution. It is therefore imperative that the issues 
discussed above inform how Canadian policy-makers, legislators, and judicial and 
administrative decision-makers interpret the conditions faced by sexual minorities in 
sources of alternate refuge.
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